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Elose Gratton* and
Privacy, Trusts and Cross-Border
Pierre-Christian Collins Hoffman** Transfers of Personal Information:
The Quebec Perspective in the
Canadian Context
.This paper argues that data protection laws apply to prevent the disclosure
of certain information relating to trusts, which are increasingly being used
.as business and investment vehicles. Given the broad scope of the concept
of "personal information" found under both provincial and federal personal
information protection statutes, arguments can be made that information relating
to trust beneficiaries or trustees, where such beneficiaries or trustees are natural
persons, enjoy some level of protection. Even where a trust contains an express
choice of law clause providing that the laws of another province or country
apply, Quebec conflict of laws rules may point to the application of Quebec's
own personal information protection legislation. Hence, in order to avoid liability,
trustees should use caution before disclosing trust-related information where part
of the trust's business operations is outsourced to foreign jurisdictions, or where a
foreign authority may request the disclosure of such information.

Cet article soutient que les lois en matiere de protection des renseignements
personnels ont pour effet d'interdire la communication de certains renseignements
relatifs aux fiducies, qui sont de plus en plus employees comme instruments
d'affaires et dinvestissement. Compte tenu de la port6e 6tendue de la notion
de - renseignement personnel " figurant aux lois provinciales et fed~rales en
matiere de protection des renseignements personnels, il peut 6tre avanc6 que les
renseignements relatifs aux b~n~ficiaires de fiducies ou aux fiduciaires, lorsque
ces derniers sont des personnes physiques, peuvent profiter d'un certain degr6
de protection. Mme lorsqu'une fiducie contient une clause prdvoyant un choix
expr~s d'une loi d'une autre province ou d'un autre pays, les r~gles en matiere
de droit international priv6 du Quebec peuvent conduire
Iapplication des
lois du Quebec en mati~re de protection des renseignements personnels. Par
cons6quent, afin d'6viter d'engager leur responsabilit6, les fiduciaires doivent
faire preuve de prudence avant de divulguer de 'information relative j une fiducie
lorsqu'une partie des activitds commerciales de la fiducie est donn6e en soustraitance 6 des entreprises situ~es dans d'autres 6tats, ou lorsqu'une autoritd
dtrang~repeut requ6rir la divulgation de tels renseignements.
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Introduction
1. Applicability of the Quebec Private Sector Act
1. Applicability of the Act to information relating to trusts and their
beneficiaries
a. Civil and common law trusts
b. Can a trust be consideredto be "carryingon an enterprise"
under the Quebec Private Sector Act?
c. Can information pertaining to trusts (such as financial
information) qualify as "personal information" protected
under the Quebec Private Sector Act?
Broad interpretation of '"personal information" under
PIPEDA
Quebec definition of "personalinformation" is even more
extensive than under PIPEDA
Financial information of a trust considered as the personal
information of beneficiaries
Evaluatingthe risk ofharmfor beneficiariespriorto disclosure
2. Conflict of laws issues
a. Foreign law governing the administrationof a trust
b. Can the Quebec Private Sector Act prevail over the laws of
anotherstate?
Can the processing of a request for the communication of
personal information be considered as an aspect pertaining
to the administrationof a trust?
Can the conflict of laws public order exception apply?
Can the Quebec Private Sector Act overrideforeign privacy
laws?
II.
Application of the Quebec Private Sector Act
1. Outsourcingof the processingofpersonalinformation to aforeign
service provider
a. Less restrictive interpretation:contractualmeasures
b. More restrictive interpretation: analysis of foreign law
required
2. Trustees disclosingpersonalinformation to aforeign government
upon request
a. Can trustees disclose information ifit is considered as their
own personal information?
b. Can trustees be compelled by a foreign government to
communicatepersonal information without contraveningthe
Quebec Private Sector Act?
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Section 18(5) disclosureexception: public body in the exercise
of its function
Section 18(6) disclosure exception: body having the power to
compel communication
c. Information already in the hands of the federal government
which may be disclosed
III. Consequences of an unauthorizedcommunication under the Quebec
law
Conclusion

Introduction
Throughout the centuries, trusts have evolved from legal claims in equity
presented to the Lord Chancellor by landowners returning from the
Crusades in the 12th century to international business instruments used as
investment vehicles in which trustees may manage assets, securities, real
estate, natural resources, or public utilities. Whether they are listed on a
stock exchange or private, trusts are employed in a context where the flow
of data and information among states, investors, and market participants
is an ever increasing phenomenon. For instance, businesses trying to
reduce their costs often consider outsourcing part of their activities, which
may involve transferring the personal information of their members,
employees, or customers outside of their jurisdiction. Cloud computing
services1 also generate large amounts of personal information that may be
stored in a different jurisdiction from where the information originated.
As reported in the media, there are increasing concerns regarding local
and foreign government surveillance of online or mobile user activities,
as well as cross-border data exchange cooperation between states or
international treaties entered into for law enforcement purposes. 2 All of
this contributes to a growth in legitimate concerns about the security of

1. Cloud computing is the delivery of computing services over the Internet. See Fact Sheets: Cloud
Computing, online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <http://www.priv.gc.ca>.
2.
Scott Shane, "Ex-Contractor Is Charged in Leaks on N.S.A. Surveillance," The New York Times
(21 June 2013); Lee Berthiaume, "'Significant concerns': Canada's privacy watchdog launches probe
into sweeping U.S. spy programs," Postmedia News (11 June 2013), online: National Post <http://
news.nationalpost.com>.
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personal information transferred to foreign jurisdictions that either do not
have adequate data protection laws or in which there *is the potential that
data will be misused or used for a different purpose than it would be under
local laws.3
In Canada, the federal PersonalInformationProtectionand Electronic
DocumentsAct 4 sets out ground rules for how private sector organizations
may collect, use, and disclose personal information in the course of their
commercial activities.5 The federal government may exempt organizations
or activities in provinces that have their own data protection laws if those
laws are substantially similar to the federal law. The provinces of British
Columbia,6 Alberta7 and Quebec have enacted provincial data protection
legislation that has been recognized as substantially similar to PIPEDA;
this legislation operates in place of PIPEDA in those provinces for intraprovincial matters.8
The Quebec Act respecting the Protection of PersonalInformation
in the Private Sector,9 which came into effect in January 1994, was
enacted to provide a legal framework for enterprises' collection, use and

3.
For example, many have raised their concerns that the US PatriotAct may allow US intelligence
to obtain access to their personal information with minimal procedural hurdles. See Sean Gallagher,.
"PATRIOT Act and privacy laws take a bite out of US cloud business: European IT companies are
using uncertainty about the US's surveillance laws ... " Ars Technica (8 December 2011), online: Ars
Technica <http://arstechnica.com>.
4.
SC 2000, c 5 [PIPEDA]. Bill S-4, the DigitalPrivacy Act, currently being debated in the House
of Commons, proposes several amendments to PIPEDA. Among other things, Bill S-4 introduces
provisions to permit organizations to disclose personal information where the disclosure is made for
the purposes of preventing, detecting or suppressing firaud, or where "reasonable for the purposes of
investigation of a breach of an agreement or a contravention of the laws of Canada." These additional
permissions to disclose, as well as new penalties and powers given to the Privacy Commissioner, have
been criticized for opening the door to warrantless data sharing and excessive disclosures. For instance,
see Michael Geist, "Why the Digital Privacy Act Undermines Our Privacy: Bill S-4 Risks Widespread
Warrantless Disclosure" (10 April 2014), online: Michael Geist <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2014/04/
s-4-post>.
5. PIPEDA, ibid,s 3. PIPEDA is applicable to organizations carrying on "federal work, undertaking
or business" (ss 2, 4(1)(b)) and organizations in provinces and territories where no personal information
protection act has been enacted, such as Ontario (ie, all provinces except Quebec, Alberta and British
Columbia).
6.
PersonalInformationProtectionAct, SBC 2003, c 63 [BCPIPA].
7. PersonalInformation ProtectionAct, SA 2003, c P-6.5 [ABPIPAI. On 15 November 2013, the
Supreme Court of Canada declared unconstitutional and struck down ABPIPA on grounds of freedom
of expression and granted a 12-month stay of the declaration of invalidity: Alberta (Informationand
Privacy Commissioner) v United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401, 2013 SCC 62, [20131 3
SCR 733 [United Food].
8. The Manitoba Legislature has passed The Personal Information Protectionand Identity Theft
PreventionAct, CCSM c P33.7, which was given royal assent on 13 September 2013. However, it has
yet to come into force.
9.
An Act Respecting the Protectionof PersonalInformation in the PrivateSector, CQLR, c P-39.1
[Quebec Private Sector Act].
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communication of personal information to third parties, ° and to further
protect and enshrine the fundamental right to privacy of natural persons'
as provided by the Civil Code of Quebec 12 and the Quebec Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms.13
The Act is similar, in essence, to PIPEDA and the personal information
protection acts of Alberta and British Columbia. Quebec has enacted one
of the most rigorous privacy legislation regimes in Canada and was the
first province in which a privacy statute regulating the protection and
communication of personal information held by enterprises came into
effect.
In the context of international trusts constituted for profit, such as
investment trusts, resource trusts, business trusts, and real estate investment
trusts (REITs), beneficiaries, trustees and asset management consultants
should be aware of the laws applicable to the protection or disclosure of
personal information, particularly where a trust may be administered in
multiple countries, manage assets in different states and have beneficiaries
of different nationalities.
In Part I of this article, we assess whether data protection laws, such
as the Quebec PrivateSector Act, apply to information pertaining to a trust
and its beneficiaries, even if such trust is governed by foreign legislation,
either by choice or through proximity factors pointing to the law of another
state, where there is still some connection with Quebec and where the trust
can be considered to carry on an enterprise in Quebec. In Part II, working
under the assumption that the Quebec PrivateSector Act applies to various
types of trusts created for generating profit (and more specifically, to the
information pertaining to the trust and its beneficiaries), we examine the
legality of the disclosure or transfer of this information, first to a foreign
jurisdiction as part of the outsourcing of operations (for instance, following
the hiring of a foreign service provider or the use of cloud services), and
second, to a foreign (non-Canadian) government following a request made
for the disclosure of (or access to) information relating to trusts and their
beneficiaries (including financial information). In Part III, we review
the potential civil and penal liability to which trustees may be subject to

10. Ibid, s 1.
11. Qudbec, Assemblde nationale, Journaldes dbats de la Commission de la culture, 36th Leg, 2nd
Sess, No 23 (6 December 2001); SyndicatdeAutobus Terremont Itie (CSN) c Autobus Terremont tde,
2010 QCCA 1050 at para 98.

12.

Arts 35-40 CCQ 1 [CCQ].

13.

CQLR, c C-12, s 5 [Quebec Charter].
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under Quebec law, following an illegal cross-border or an unauthorized
disclosure of the personal information pertaining to beneficiaries. 4
I. Applicability of the Quebec Private Sector Act
The Quebec Private Sector Act only applies where a person "carries out
an enterprise" within the meaning of article 1525 of the CCQ,5 and to
information held by such a person if such information can qualify as
"personal information" as defined in the Act. Therefore, a twofold test
must be met for the Quebec Private Sector Act to apply to the collection,
holding, use, and communication of private information by a trustee.
Even where these two tests are satisfied, the question arises whether a
choice of law clause inserted in a trust deed or geographical factors of
proximity that would point to the law of another state for purposes of
the administration or validity of the trust, may render the Quebec Private
Sector Act inapplicable by virtue of conflict of laws rules.
In this part, we will assess whether the Quebec Private Sector Act
may apply to trusts, if these trusts are said to be carrying on business in
Quebec, and if their information, such as financial information pertaining
to the trusts, can qualify as personal information of the trust beneficiaries.
Second, we will analyze whether the Quebec PrivateSector Act may apply
to trusts for matters that pertain to the protection of personal information,
even in cases where the conflict of laws rules point to the law of another
state.
1. Applicability of the Act to information relating to trusts and their
beneficiaries
a. Civil and common law trusts
Under the Civil Code of Lower Canada, trusts could not be created nor
used in Quebec for commercial purposes.' 6 Since the coming into force of
the new civil code in 1994, a private trust can indisputably be created for

14. This paper is restricted to the perspective Quebec PrivateSector Act and related Quebec privacy
legislation, although case law rendered by other Canadian courts under similar privacy statutes
was contemplated. Quebec conflict of laws rules were also examined to determine whether the law
applicable to the validity or administration of a trust (for instance, when parties have included a
provision in the act or deed of trust under which a foreign law may apply), could trigger the application
of foreign law where privacy protection issues arise or, instead, whether the Quebec Private SectorAct
would nonetheless apply to a trust which has some type of proximity factors with Quebec, for example
if these trusts are said to be carrying on business in Quebec.
15. Quebec PrivateSector Act, supra note 9, s 1.
16. Crown Trust v Higher,[1977] 1 SCR 418.
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the sole purpose of carrying on an enterprise. 7 Article 1269 of the CCQ
now provides that "[a] trust constituted by onerous title...particular[ly]
[one created for the purpose] of allowing the making of profit by means of
investment... is also a private trust."
A trust may be "carrying on an enterprise" within the meaning of
article 1525 of the CCQ even if it has not been constituted under Quebec
law, as long as the statute under which the trust was constituted allows for
the creation of trusts for that purpose.
b.

Can a trust be consideredto be "carryingon an enterprise" under the
Quebec Private Sector Act?
The Quebec Private Sector Act applies where an individual or a legal
person collects, holds, uses or communicates personal information to third
parties "in the course of carrying on an enterprise within the meaning of
article 1525 of the Civil Code." This section defines the "carrying on of an
enterprise" as:
The carrying on by one or more persons of an organized economic
activity, whether or not it is commercial in nature, consisting ofproducing,
administering or alienating property, or providing a service[.] 8
This definition of "enterprise" is broader than the definition of "commercial
activity" previously found under the Civil Code of Lower Canada.An
enterprise does not have to carry on activities that are "commercial in
nature" for this Code to apply.' 9 Therefore, the definition of "enterprise" is
interpreted very broadly, for instance, to include non-profit organizations,
professionals, artisans or agricultural activities.
20
While the enterprise has to be carried on in the province of Quebec,
courts have applied broad criteria in order to determine this geographical
factor. For example, in Guay, the Court of Quebec ruled that the
Commission d'acc~s A l'information du Qu6bec, 2' the administrative
court specialized in the application of the Quebec Private Sector Act, had
rightfully considered that the Insurance Institute of Canada, a nonprofit
and educational organization, carried on an enterprise in Quebec, since it

17. Andrd Morrissette, "L'utilisation Des Fiducies Dans Un Contexte Commercial," (1996) Rfps
925; Nabil NAntaki & Charlaine Bouchard, Droi:EtPatiqueDeL 'entreprise,v7, 2d Ed(Cowansville,
Quebec: Editions Yvon Blais, 2007). See the Chapter Entitled "L'entreprise Selon Le Code Civil Du
Qudbec-L'Exploitation D'Une Entreprise" at para 221.
18. Art 1525 CCQ.
19. Karl Delwaide & Antoine Aylwin, LearningFrom A Decade Of Experience: Quebec s Private
Sector PrivacyAct (Ottawa: Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2005) at 5.
20. Institut d'assurancedu Canadac Guay, [1998] CAI 431 at para 41 (CQ) [Guay].
21. [CAI].
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sold course materials and offered examination and correction services in
Quebec. While the Institute had its head office in Ontario, had no place
of business in Quebec and did not hold documents containing personal
information in Quebec, the court held that it still had to comply with
the Quebec Private Sector Act, and that the Institute could not avoid the
application of the Act, for instance, by sending its documents to its Ontario
head office.
A trust company22 or an asset management consultant, which
administers or offers consultancy services to trusts in Quebec in exchange
for a commission or remuneration, would most likely be considered to
carry on an enterprise subject to the Quebec Private Sector Act. There
can be no doubt that such entities are carrying on an organized economic
activity. A consultant or trust company who holds personal information
regarding beneficiaries would therefore be subject to the Act. Consequently,
if a request for access to information is made directly to such entities, the
Quebec Private Sector Act is applicable, provided that the information
'
requested qualifies as "personal information. "23
However, does the simple act of administering a trust in itself constitute
"carrying on an enterprise" in Quebec? Further analysis of whether a trust
(and if so, which kind of trusts) can be considered as "carrying on an
enterprise" is required.
A trust will only be subject to the Quebec Private Sector Act if its
purpose is economic, 4 and if its main activities consist in the "carrying
on of an enterprise. '25 For one to "carry on an enterprise" within the
meaning of article 1525 of the CCQ, it must produce, administer or
alienate property, or provide services, for the purpose of carrying on an
"organized economic activity." According to professors Nabil N. Antaki
and Charlaine Bouchard, to carry on an "organized economic activity,"
a person must seek to satisfy needs by optimizing limited resources in a
26
market.
In 1994, Pierre Dalphond (before his appointment to the Quebec
Court of Appeal), proposed five criteria, repeatedly cited in case law, to

22. Constituted pursuant to the Act respecting trust companies and savings companies, CQLR,
c S-29.01.
23. See ibid for an analysis of which kind of information can qualify as "personal information."
24. Conseil depresse du Qudbec c Quebec (Cour du Quebec), 2006 QCCA 1282, 165 ACWS (3d)
202 [Conseilde presse].
25. If the enterprise is merely an ancillary activity of the trust, it may not be considered to be an
enterprise for the purpose of application Quebec Private Sector Act. See Congrdgationdes Tdmoins
de Jihovah D 'Issoudun-Sudc Mailly, (2000) CAI 427, (CQ).
26. Antaki & Bouchard, supranote 17.
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characterize the "carrying on of an enterprise" under article 1525 of the

CCQ:
1. necessity of a plan detailing the economic objectives of the
company and on which basis the activity is organized;
2. necessity of assets related to the objectives...;
3. necessity of a series of usual and customary legal transactions
involving the contractor and made in the pursuit of the
predetermined goals;
4. necessity of other economic stakeholders receptive to the goods or
services offered by the enterprise, generally defined as customers,
goodwill or the market; and
5. presence of economic value or a benefit directly attributable to the
efforts of the contractor.27
According to the decision of the Court of Quebec in Conseil de presse du
Quebec c. Lamoureux-Gaboury,2 there are four elements, similar to those
described above, that can be considered in the definition of an "enterprise"
and which can be useful to determine whether the activities of a trust are
subject 'to the Quebec PrivateSector Act:
1. that the operations of an enterprise constitute jurisdictional acts,
which are repetitive;
2. that there exists a coordination between human and material
resources;
3. that the organization must aim at responding and satisfying certain
needs; and
4. that its success is dependent on similar standards as to market
29
forces and the efforts deployed by the business person.
These criteria seem sufficiently broad to support the contention that the
main types of income trusts, namely, business/utility trusts, royalty trusts,
investment trusts, and real estate investment trusts, which all involve an
organized economic activity on the market, are covered by this broad
definition of "enterprise." This interpretation is in line with the views
of certain authors who propose that a liberal interpretation of the term
"enterprise" should be used:
27. Pierre J Dalphond, "Entreprise et vente d'entreprise en droit civil qudbcois," (1994) 54 R du B
35 [translated by authors].
28. [2003] CAI 686, (CQ). This decision was overruled by the Superior Court in judicial review
mainly on questions of fact; see Conseil depresse, supranote 24. For a review of this decision, see S
Reynolds, "Commentaires sur ladecision Conseil de presse du Qu~be. c Lamoureux-Gaboury-La
notion d'entreprise dans le cadre de laLoi sur laprotection des renseignements personnels dans le
secteur privd," Rep6res, (Cowansville, Quebec: Editions Yvon Blais, 2003).
29. Translation by K Delwaide & A Aylwin in Delwaide & Aylwin, supra note 19, of Justice
Bourduas' criteria in Conseil depresse du Quibec c Lamoureux-Gaboury.
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In the context of privacy legislation, the definition of "enterprise" should
benefit from a wide and liberal interpretation in order to allow the
legislation to achieve its objects of protecting personal information. °
As previously mentioned, according to a Court of Quebec decision,
the Quebec Private Sector Act applies to every enterprise that conducts
business in Quebec, independently of the location of its place of business
and the place where the personal information is stored31 ; the Court's
intention is to ensure that the Quebec Private Sector Act applies if there
are at least some kind of business activities in Quebec or other proximity
factors with Quebec.
Finally in CG Jr c. M-C B,32 the Superior Court of Quebec went as
far as concluding, without any hesitation, that the Quebec Private Sector
Act protected personal financial information relating to a trust: trusts may
carry on business in Quebec and therefore be subject to the Quebec Private
Sector Act.
The jurisprudence suggests therefore that the Quebec Private Sector
Act should apply to income trusts, asset management consultants and trust
companies where these are carrying on an enterprise in Quebec. What
remains to be determined is whether the information pertaining to a trust,
such as the beneficiaries' contact information and the financial information
of the trust, can qualify as "personal information" under the Quebec
Private Sector Act. This issue is analyzed next.
c.

Can information pertaining to trusts (such as financial information)
qualify as "personalinformation "protectedunderthe Quebec Private
Sector Act?
Personal information protected by the Quebec PrivateSectorAct is broadly
defined in section 2 as "any information which relates to a natural person
33
and allows that person to be identified.
Broad Interpretationof "personalinformation" under PIPEDA
The definition of "personal information" found in the Quebec Private
Sector Act is consubstantial to the term "personal information" defined
under PIPEDA as "information about an identifiable individual," as both
definitions come from the same source.3" At the federal level, case law

30. Delwaide & Aylwin, supra note 19 at 6 [emphasis added].
31. Guay, supranote 20.
32. 2004 CanLII 53038 (QC CS) [CG].
33. Quebec Private Sector Act, supra note 9.
34. See Elo'fse Gratton, UnderstandingPersonalInformation: Managing Privacy Risks, (Toronto:
LexisNexis, 2013) at 17 fl(see section 1.1.3: "Definition of Personal Information: Origin and
Background").
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issued under PIPEDA and the Privacy Act are clear that the definition of
personal information must be given a broad and expansive interpretation.3 5
In Wyndowe v. Rousseau,3 6 the Federal Court of Appeal mentioned that
in light of the fact that "personal information is defined...as meaning
'information about an identifiable individual.' The Act is therefore very
far reaching."37
The definition of "personal information" is so broad that almost any
information can qualify as "personal." As Barbara Mclsaac summarizes in
her treatise on Canadian privacy law, "in essence, almost any information
in any form that can be attributed to an identified individual is caught by
this expansive definition."3 8 The federal Privacy Commissioner has played
a key role in deciding whether information is "personal." The general
tendency has been expansionist.
In 2011, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada published
a handbook entitled "A Privacy Handbook for Lawyers, PIPEDA and Your
Practice" which states that: "as per relevantjurisprudence on the concept of
'personal information,' a broad and expansive interpretation is in order."3 9
According to Canadian case law, information will be "about" an individual
when it is not just the subject of that individual, but also relates to or
concerns the individual.4" That being said, it should be noted that in United
Food,the Supreme Court of Canada criticized the fact that ABPIPA "deems
'4 1
virtually all personal information to be protected regardless of context."
This ultimately resulted in the finding that ABPIPA infringed the union's

35. Dagg v Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 SCR 403 [Dagg] per Laforest J,dissenting at
para 68; Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (TransportationAccident Investigation and
Safety Board), 2006 FCA 157, 267 DLR (4th) 451 [TAISB]; Canada (Information Commissioner) v
Canada (Commissioner of the Royal CanadianMounted Police), 2003 SCC 8 at para 23, [2003] 1
SCR 66.
36. 2008 FCA 39, 373 NR 301 [Wyndowe].
37. Ibid at para 40 [emphasis added].
38. Barbara Mclsaac et al, The law ofprivacy in Canada, loose-leaf (consulted in 2011), (Toronto:
Carswell, 2011) at 4-7. See also Jeffirey A Kaufman, ed, Privacy Law in the Private Sector: An
Annotation of the Legislation in Canada(Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2007), at 15: "It is, therefore,
important to note at the outset that the definition of 'personal information' [in PIPEDA] is extremely
broad"; and Stephanie Perrin et al, The PersonalInformation Protection and Electronic Documents
Act: An Annotated Guide (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at 54: "The definition in the Act is limitless in
terms of what can be information about an identifiable individual."
39. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, A Privacy Handbookfor Lawyers, PIPEDA
and Your Practice (Ottawa: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2011), at 2 [OPCC]:
"Information will be 'about' an individual when it is not just the subject of that individual, but also
relates to or concerns the individual."
40. TAISB, supra note 35; Dagg, supra note 35.
41. United Food, supra note 7 at 25.
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freedom of expression in a disproportionate manner and the statute being
42
struck down with a 12-month stay of the declaration of invalidity.
Interestingly, the Federal Government has provided a list of information
that may be considered information about an identifiable person under the
Privacy Act, demonstrating that a very broad definition has been attached
to "personal information":
Personal information also includes any information that can remotely
be linked to a person, such as an account number; a certificate or license
number, an Internet Protocol (IP) address, a biometric identifier, a
photographic image; and any other number, characteristic, or code that
could lead to the identification of an individual. The person's name is not
always the determining factor since personal information includes any
recorded information that permits or leads to the possible identification of
an individual whether alone or when combined with information
from
43
sources "otherwise available", including public sources.
45
Furthermore, in the often cited" Gordon v. Canada (Health) decision,
the Federal Court held that information relates to an identifiable individual
where there exists a serious risk that the person could be identified with
the information or in conjunction with other information, even where such
46
secondary source of information is public.

Quebec definition of "personalinformation" is even more extensive than
under PIPEDA
The notion of "personal information" as provided by section 2 of the
Quebec Private Sector Act has also been interpreted broadly by the CAI
and Quebec courts. 47 The definition of personal information under the
Quebec PrivateSector Act is even broader than under PIPEDA.
Unlike PIPEDA, the Quebec Private Sector Act does not expressly
exclude "business contact information" from the scope of its definition,
which is information relating to "professional/employment status" (such
42. Ibidat37and40.
43. Guidance on Preparing Information Sharing Agreements Involving Personal Information,
online: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca> [footnote omitted].
44. See, e.g.: Leon ' FurnitureLimited v Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2011
ABCA 94, 502 AR 110; Re Schindler Elevator Corporation, 2012 BCIPC 25; Order F2008-025,
2009 CanLIl 90959 (AB OIPC); Order F2010-018, 2011 CanLlI 96615 (AB OIPC); Un gestionnaire
r'vble le salaired 'un employs dans le cadre d'une remarque-leconsentement tait nicessairemalgr6
l'obligationd'informer le public, 2010 CanLII 72777 (CVPC).
45. 2008 FC 258, 324 FTR 94 [Gordon].

46.

Ibid.

47. It includes handwritten notes if they relate to a particular individual. See Assurance-vie
DesjardinsLaurentienneinc c Stdbenne, [1997] RSQ 2871, (CQ). It also includes notes of an attorney
about his client if the information contained therein relates to a natural person and allows him to be
identified. See Hudon v Desrosiers, [1996] CAI 189.
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as an individual's name, title, business address, or telephone number at
work),4" although in a few CAI decisions, information about an employee,
when acting as a representative of a corporation, was excluded from the
definition of "personal information."49
In contrastwith the IMS Health Canada ruling under PIPEDA,5 ° the
CAI has considered that the "work product" of a professional (such as a
pharmacist or a physician) should be considered "personal information"
relating to that professional. 5 In decisions rendered under PIPEDA on
whether "work product" information should be considered as "personal
information," the OPCC has been using a "total context approach," which
has allowed more flexibility.2 The OPCC has therefore not been employing
the same approach as the CAI, under which most information (even work
product information) qualifies as "personal information" encompassed
under the scope of the Quebec Private Sector Act.
Also, the Quebec Private Sector Act, unlike other Canadian private
sector data protection statutes, does not include a specific exemption
for personal information that may be otherwise publicly available.53

48. See PIPEDA, supranote 4, s 2.
49. Part 3 of this paper elaborates on this case law.
.50. See PIPEDA Case Summary #2001-15, Privacy Commissioner releases his finding on the
prescribing pattern of doctors (2 October 2011), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada <http://www.priv.gc.ca>.
51. See the Superior Court's judgment in IMS du CanadaLtie c CAI, 2002 CarswellQue 519, and
the reasons of the decision rendered by the CAI, as referred to at paragraphs 2 to 6 and 11 to 13. It took
an amendment (in 2001) to the Quebec PrivateSector Act to allow the communication to third parties
of "work product" information. For example, in March 2005 (File No 04 17 07), the CAI granted to an
enterprise, under sec'tion 21.1 of the Act, the authorization to receive communication from pharmacists
of certain personal information on prescription drugs. The CAI specifically underlined that information
on the "Pharmacy (Identification) Number," its Postal Code, the dates of the transactions, the costs of
a drug and the mode of payment are "personal information" on the activities of the pharmacy owners.
The CAI therefore considered that the "work product" of a professional (such as a pharmacist or a
physician) should be considered "personal information" related to that professional.
52. The OPCC is no longer limited by the rigid distinction between personal information "produced
in a work or business context" and other types of personal information, and it has been using a
"total context approach" to determine whether certain types of data created by an employee should
be excluded from the application of PIPEDA. See PIPEDA Case Summary #2001-15, Privacy
Commissioner releases his finding on the prescribingpatternsof doctors (2 October 2001); PIPEDA
Case Summary #2003-220, Telemarketer objects to employer sharing her sales results with other
employees (15 September 2003), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <http://
www.priv.gc.ca>; PIPEDA Case Summary #2005-303 Real estate brokerpublishes names of top five
sales representativesin a city (31 May 2005), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<http://www.priv.gc.ca>.
53. PIPEDA Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information, SOR/2001-7 have been in
force since 2001 'and exclude certain types of publicly available information. See also the ABPIPA, at
Part 2, Division 3, s 14 (e) and Part 2, Division 4, s 17, and the BCPIPA, at Part 4, s 12 (1) (e), Part 5, s
15 (1) and (3) and Part 6, s 18 (1) (a). See also Eloise Gratton, supra note 34 at 300 fI, which elaborates
on the exemptions found in various Canadian data protection laws for information publicly available.
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Therefore, the Quebec PrivateSectorAct applies even to publicly available
information.
Financialinformation of a trust considered as the personal information
of beneficiaries
Given the very broad interpretation of "personal information," it is
reasonable to assume that financial information in connection with a trust
would be interpreted as being the personal information of the beneficiaries.
There is a privacy interest at stake in preventing the disclosure of
financial and commercial information. For instance, in Soci&tk qu~becoise
d'initiativesagro-alimentairesc. Libman, the Court of Quebec noted that
the financial statements of a corporate body are protected from disclosure
under section 5 of the Quebec Charter,which sets out that "[e]very person
has a right to respect for his private life. '5 4 Quebec courts have also
recognized that corporations may invoke the right to privacy set out in the
Quebec Charterand the CCQ to prevent the disclosure of documentation
or information such as annual reports and books of account,55 commercial
secrets and number of employees,56 investment and development
strategies, and documents relating to a commercial transaction. 7 That
being said, in the case of a trust, the privacy interest in protecting financial
and commercial information rests with the trustees and beneficiaries given
that trusts do not possess legal personality. Where beneficiaries are natural
persons, financial details of the trust protected under the beneficiaries'
right to privacy may translate into personal information.
In one Quebec case, financial information relating to beneficiaries of a
trust was construed as personal information. In CG, the Superior Court had
to determine whether a spouse could, in divorce proceedings, subpoena
the other spouse to obtain the names of beneficiaries contained in a trust
deed and the financial statements of a trust. The Court ultimately quashed
the writ of subpoena duces tecum, as it sought the producing of personal
documents protected under article 36(6) of the CCQ. Richard J. noted that
the information requested was protected by the Quebec PrivateSector Act,
therefore implying that financial information relating to beneficiaries of a
trust is protected under the Act.58

54. REJB 1998-08141, JE 98-1648 (CQ) at para 28 [translation by authors].
55. Commissaire de la concurrencec 9044-0413 Qudbec inc, REJB 2001-30799 (QC CS).
56. Jardinsdu Mont inc c Provigo Distributioninc, REJB 1994-28713 (QC CS).
57. Rigie intermunicipalede gestion des dchets de la Mauricie c Service special de vidanges inc,
REJB 1997-00594 (CA).
58. CG, supranote 32.
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While this may be the only decision on point, an analogy may be
drawn with shareholders' information within a corporation. In EnCana
Corporation v. Douglas, the Alberta Court of Appeal held that the
information comprised in a corporation's securities register, which includes
the shareholders' names and addresses, was personal information of these
shareholders and was therefore protected under the ABPIPA and PIPEDA:
Both statutes define personal information as "information about an
identifiable individual"...As none of the exclusions limiting personal
information apply, the information within a securitiesregisteris personal

information. Both statutes place responsibilities on organizations to
protect the privacy of personal information[.]59
Thus, by analogy, if the financial information of a trust requested by a
foreign government contains the name or address of a beneficiary, such
information should be considered as "personal information" protected
under the Quebec Private Sector Act. There can also be no doubt that the
names of the beneficiaries contained in trust deeds is personal information.
Evaluatingthe risk of harmfor beneficiariesprior to disclosure

The definitions of "personal information" that have emerged over the
last forty years in various data protection statutes around the world are
similar and have been found to be vague, especially in light of big data
and sophisticated technologies. Any information can be linked to an
individual, and with new types of information (IP addresses, biometric
information, etc.), such definitions raise a myriad of uncertainties. As a
consequence, various European and North American authors are proposing
new methods for determining which types of information should qualify as
personal. 60 One approach suggests that in case of uncertainty the emphasis
should be on the "risk of harm" to an individual should the information
be disclosed. The nature of such risk may either be subjective (e.g.,
humiliation, embarrassment) or objective (e.g., financial harm, physical
harm or discrimination).
Using this new approach to interpretation, in the event that a trustee
wishes to outsource certain aspects involving the management of personal
information to a foreign service provider, or upon a trustee receiving a
request by a foreign government to communicate certain information
59. 2005 ABCA 439 at 25, 262 DLR (4th) 279 [emphasis added].
60. See, e.g., Bogtjan Bercic & Carlisle George, "Identifying Personal Data Using Relational
Database Design Principles" (2009) 17 Int'l JL & IT 233; Patrick Luandevall-Unger & Tommy Tranvik,
"IP Addresses: Just a Number?" (2011) 19 Int'l JL & IT 53; Paul M Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, "The
PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information" (2011) 86 NYUL
Rev 1814; Paul Ohm, "Broken Promises of Privacy" (2010) 57 UCLA L Rev 1701.
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pertaining to a trust, the trustee should determine if the communication
may create a risk of harm to the beneficiaries, for example, identify theft
or tax liability. If, for instance, the beneficiaries may suffer harm resulting
from this communication, the trustees should assume that the information
qualifies as "personal information" and therefore refuse to disclose the
information to the foreign government (unless such communication is
authorized by law or the beneficiaries of the trust have consented to it).
If a beneficiary is not an individual, one may not invoke the Quebec
Private Sector Act as a source of protection, since the legal person's
information (such as its name) is not personal information regarding
individuals. However, if the information requested allows for the
identification of natural persons within the legal person, the Quebec
Private Sector Act should provide protection for their right to privacy, if
there exists a serious possibility that the information in itself, or combined
with other available information, would allow for the identification
of natural persons. 6' Even information already accessible on a public
registry such as the Quebec Enterprise Register or Corporations Canada
(e.g., names of main shareholders, directors, officers) is still governed by
the Quebec Private Sector Act since there. is no exclusion for publicly
available information.
Once it is determined that the Quebec Private Sector Act might
apply to a trust, the next step is to ascertain whether conflict of law rules
nonetheless stand in the Way of is application.
2. Conflict of laws issues
a. Foreign law governing the administrationof a trust
The first paragraph of article 3107 of the CCQ sets out the basic conflict of
laws rule regarding trusts:
Where no law is expressly designated by, or may be inferred with

certaintyfrom, the terms of the act creating a trust, or where the law
designated does not recognize the institution, the applicable law is that
with which the trust is most closely connected. 62
A choice of law may be implicit where the construction of the terms of
the constituting act or deed of trust clearly reveal that the settlor wished
61. Gordon, supranote 45 at para 34.
62. [Emphasis added]. In its Official Commentary, the Quebec legislature mentions that article 3107
is inspired by the Hague Convention of 1985, (Convention of I July 1985 on the Law Applicable to
Trusts and on their Recognition) and enacts the principle of the autonomy of the settlor's intent and
the specificity of the trust with respect to its constituting act. Therefore, in principle, a trust will first be
governed by the law that is specified in its constituting act or that was implicitly chosen by the settlor
(which may be the same person as the trustee in the case of a common law trust).
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to create a trust governed by the law of a specific state. For instance, if
the constituting act borrows typical language used in provisions regarding
trusts contained in the CCQ, one could reasonably conclude that the settlor
intended to create a Quebec civil law trust.
As for an express choice, a typical choice of law clause contained in a
trust deed or constituting act would read as follows:
This trust shall be exclusively governed and construed according to the
laws of [Country or Province], without regard to the conflict of laws
rules of such state.63

In the absence of a choice of law clause, a court will have to determine the
jurisdiction in which the trust is most closely connected through a series of
proximity factors. The law applicable to a trust will be assessed according
to, in particular, "the place of administration of the trust, the place where the
trust property is situated, the residence or the establishment of the trustee,
the objects of the trust and the places where they are to be fulfilled."'
b. Can the Quebec Private Sector Act prevail over the laws of another
state?

If the law of another state or province applies to a trust, one may argue
that the Quebec Private Sector Act cannot apply, and that the privacy or

63. G~rald Goldstein, Droit InternationalPrivY, volume 1, Conflits de lois: dispositions genrales
et spcifiques (Cowansville, Quebec: Editions Yvon Blais, 2011) at 382 [emphasis added]. In standard
clauses such as this one, the choice of law specifies that the conflict of laws rules of the law of the
chosen state do not apply. Such a stipulation is redundant where a motion is presented in a forum
in which the doctrine of renvoi has been rejected by the legislature or the courts. In Quebec, article
3080 of the CCQ expressly rejects the doctrine of renvoi, which means that if a request for access to
personal information is made in Quebec, the competent court will only consider the conflict of laws
proyisions of the CCQ to determine the applicable law. Whether express or implicit, the choice of law
is paramount and the criteria contained in the second paragraph of article 3107 will not apply if the law
of a specific state was chosen in the act that created the trust. Professor Goldstein further opines that
courts should also avoid using, where the act that created the trust contains a choice of law, the third
paragraph of article 3107 to perform a d~pegage by virtue of the principle of proximity to sever the
trust and apply different laws, since the wishes of the settlor should prevail on this principle (Ibid at
382-383). In short, where the act or deed that created the trust contains a choice of law, the proximity
of the trust to another state (such as Quebec) is not akin to the question of the trust's applicable law.
64. Art 3107(1) CCQ.
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data protection legislation of the other state is the applicable law (if such
65
legislation even exists).
It is not entirely evident, however, whether the handling of a request for
the disclosure of personal information relating to a trust or its beneficiaries
is part of the trustees' administrative tasks according to Quebec conflict
of laws provisions. In addition, one may argue that public order laws such
as the Quebec Private Sector Act apply nonetheless to the disclosure of
personal information pertaining to trust beneficiaries, regardless of the
fact that the administration of the trust is governed by the laws of another
state, if the trust is carrying on business in Quebec.66 Moreover, even if
Quebec private international law provisions point to the law of another
state, certain Quebec statutes that are considered of "public order" or that
have a "particular object" may still apply to a trust governed by foreign
legislation, especially for issues that may not necessarily be included in
the administration or validity of a trust. These points are discussed next.
Can the processing of a request for the communication of personal
information be considered as an aspect pertainingto the administration
of a trust?
Whether the handling of arequest for the disclosure of personal information
by trustees and compliance with data protection and privacy laws pertain
to the administration or validity of a trust are questions that must be
67
determined in accordance with the law governing the trust.
According to Professor Goldstein, under Quebec law, what the
administration of the trust consists of is very extensive and comprises the
rights of the beneficiaries and the settlor.68 On the other hand, Professor
Waters argues that under common law, "an issue will not be administrative
65. For instance, in the US, there is no private sector data protection statute such as PIPEDA or
the Quebec Private Sector Act that covers all personal information governed by any organization,
although certain types of sensitive information are protected by sectoral laws. The following acts
protect specific types of information in specific contexts: The Family EducationalRights and Privacy
Act of 1974, 20 USC § 1232g(b)(1) (2000) requires educational agencies or institutions that receive
government funding not to disclose students and education records without written consent; The Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 USC §§ 551 (b)-(c) (2000) limits the extent to which a cable
service may collect or disclose PII about subscribers; The Video Privacy ProtectionAct of 1988, 18
USC § 2710(b)(1) (2000) enacts civil liability for video stores that disclose PII about any customer and
protects against unconstrained dissemination of video rental records; The Driver'sPrivacy Protection
Act of 1994, 18 USC §§ 2721-2725 (2000) restricts the use of personal information contained in state
motor vehicle records; The Health Insurance Portabilityand Accountability Act of 1996, 42 USC §§
1320d-1320d-8 (2000) protects the privacy of personal health information in electronic health care
transactions.
66. See part 1b of this paper entitled "Can a trust be considered to be "carrying on an enterprise"
under the Quebec PrivateSector Act?".
67. Art 3108(l) CCQ.
68. Goldstein, supranote 63 at 384-385.
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if it involves the nature or quantum of the beneficial interests."69 In other
words, the scope of the notion of administrationappears narrower under
common law than under Quebec civil law. Thus, if the law of a common
law province has been chosen for the administration of a trust, the
beneficiaries' right to the protection of their personal information could be
viewed by a Quebec court as an aspect separate from the administration
of the trust.
One should note that under the Canadian common law, trustees
have a duty to disclose certain information to beneficiaries. The Court of
Queen's Bench of Saskatchewan has confirmed that the duty to disclose
trust information and provide an accounting to beneficiaries is an aspect
encompassed within the administration of the trust:
This duty to account is an aspect of trust administration. As noted
in Schmidt v. Rosewood Trust Limited, [2003] UKPC 26, [2003] 3 All

E.R. 76, at para. 66, in the context of access to trust documents:
Their Lordships have already indicated their view that a beneficiary's
right to seek disclosure of trust documents, although sometimes not
inappropriately described as a proprietary right, is best approached
as one aspect of the court's inherent jurisdiction to supervise
(and
70
where appropriate intervene in) the administration of trusts.
In the leading Ontario case, Sandford v. Porter, the Ontario Court
of Appeal described the duty to disclose as "[t]he duty of a trustee or
other accounting party is to have his accounts always ready, to afford
all reasonable facilities for inspection and examination, and to give full
information whenever required. ' 7' This duty has also been described as
follows by Professor Waters:
A trustee is essentially one who is managing the affairs of others. He
may have a personal beneficial interest, indeed, he may for all apparent
purposes be the only beneficiary, but as a trustee he still remains subject
to the obligation to account for his administrationto those who may
have an interestin the trustfund, whether as beneficiary or creditor.This
obligation has been called the duty to disclose.72

Trust beneficiaries are not the only persons who may obtain accounting
from trustees. Professor Waters explains that creditors and persons with an

69. Donovan WM Waters, Lav of Trusts in Canada,2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) at 1127.
70. Tinline v Larente, 2013 SKQB 167 at para 18, 420 Sask R 81 [emphasis added].
71. (1889), 16 OAR 565 at para 21 (Ont CA).
72. Donovan WM Waters, Water's Law of Trusts in Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at
section 19IV [footnotes omitted] [emphasis added].
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"interest" may also request accounting from trustees, but that their right is
not absolute:
Creditors will normally have the right to demand an account as a
consequence of statute, but the question arises as to what persons with
an interest in the trust can claim an accounting. An "interest" is in fact
broadly construed. Persons with vested or contingent interests are
entitled to seek an inspection or request the court for an accounting, and
next-of-kin and personal representatives of such interested persons are
recognized. As far as asking the court for an accounting is concerned,
none of these persons has an absolute right.73
Considering the broad interpretation of "interest" and the uncertainty as
to whom has a right to obtain trust information from trustees, the author
opines that in principle, the safest practice for trustees would be to disclose
trust information to anyone who has an interest in the trust, even if such
interest is potential.
According to the extensive scope of "interest" proposed by such a
practice, trustees might be inclined to disclose information to a foreign.
authority, such as one who would have an interest in obtaining trust
information and accounting for the purpose of collecting taxes in its
jurisdiction. However, Professor Waters states that trustees may choose
to refrain from disclosing where they are asked to release information that
does not constitute "trust information," as a request for such information
74
would not fall under their duty to disclose.
The author further mentions that the information requested may be
personal information:
Quite apart from the reasons 'the trustees had for reaching their
distributive decisions, the written material originated by the trustees and
sought by the beneficiary may reveal personal information about another
beneficiary. References to an individual's drug usage, health problems,
marital situation, or similar private circumstance would be this type of
information.75

73.
74.

Ibid.
Ibid. Waters also notes that:
Having this basic duty in mind, plus a prima facie willingness to release information
concerning the existence and terms of the trust, and the trust accounts, trustees might well
be advisedtofollow a practiceof releasingwritten information to any person with a vested,
contingent, or potential interest. This would be done on the interested party's request, but
without previous request except where the interest of the beneficiary is remote in the sense
that vesting is most unlikely, or the opportunity for the power or discretion to be exercised
is equally unlikely (Ibid, [emphasis added]).
75. Ibid.
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Thus, it can be argued that where the information requested relates to the
personal information of beneficiaries, the release of such information is,
as Professor Waters states, "extraneous to the exercise" of the trustees'
powers. While trustees may have a duty to disclose trust information to
creditors or persons with an interest in the trust, they certainly do not have
a duty to disclose personal information relating to beneficiaries. Therefore,
it would seem that one may not use the duty to disclose to argue that
the trustees' processing of requests for personal information relating to
beneficiaries is part of the administration of the trust pursuant to conflict
of laws rules.
Finally, it can simply be asserted that the right to privacy found in the
Quebec Private Sector Act, a fundamental right, cannot be interpreted to
be part of the administration of a trust, therefore rendering the Quebec
Private Sector Act applicable to the management of personal information
pertaining to the beneficiaries of the trust. In Lawson v. Accusearch Inc.,76
Harrington J. of the Federal Court of Canada held that "PIPEDA...does
not, I would think, embrace conflict of laws rules[.]" 77 While this view
was provided in connection with PIPEDA, given that the Quebec Private
Sector Act has essentially the same purpose as PIPEDA (protecting the
privacy of individuals, amongst other things),78 this provides for an
additional argument in support of the view that data protection laws
should always- apply, whether in the context of outsourcing activities that
involve the transfer of personal information to a foreign jurisdiction or
when managing a request for access to personal information by a foreign
government, regardless of conflict of laws rules.
Can the conflict of laws public order exception apply?

Even if a Quebec court were to find that the Quebec Private Sector Act
would not normally apply to information relating to trust beneficiaries
because of conflict of laws rules, it could still cite the "public order
exception" set out in article 3081 of the CCQ. It provides:
The provisions of the law of a foreign country do not apply if their
application would be manifestly inconsistent
with public order as
79
understood in internationalrelations.

To determine whether this exception applies where the law of a foreign
country or province governs a trust, a court will have to review the law
76.
77.
78.
79.

2007 FC 125, [2007] 4 FCR 314.
Ibid at 37.
See Gratton, supra note 34 at 14 ff.
[emphasis added].

276

The Dalhousie Law Journal

of that country or province to determine whether it sufficiently protects
the right to privacy of the beneficiaries. As professor Goldstein points
out, Quebec courts have usually applied the "public order exception"
restrictively."0 A statute that may be considered of public order under
Quebec internal law will not always be of "public order as understood in
international relations.""1 The exception will only arise where there exists
a concrete and serious conflict between Quebec law and the law of the
foreign country (e.g., if there is seriously deficient privacy legislation or
simply no private sector legislation or privacy protection statute in the
foreign state).8 2 There must also be actual contact with Quebec public
order (e.g., if a beneficiary domiciled in Quebec or if assets located in
Quebec may be affected in an unacceptable way). 3
Where a choice of law or proximity factors renders PIPEDA, 4 ABPIPA
or BCPIPA applicable to a trust, it is very unlikely that its enforcement
could command the application of the public order exception, since such
privacy or data protection laws, if compared with the Quebec Private
Sector Act, may offer adequate and similar levels of protection of personal
information.8 5 This being said, even if the public order exception is not
found to be applicable, the Quebec Private Sector Act may nonetheless
override the law of another province or country that offers similar data and
personal information protection if, by reason of its "particular object" and
its fundamental statuts, it can be considered to apply regardless of conflict
of laws provisions.
Can the Quebec Private Sector Act overrideforeign privacy laws?
Parliamentary debates reveal that the Quebec Private Sector Act was
enacted to enhance the protection of personal information already provided
by the CCQ and the Quebec Charter.6 In 2002, during the debates on Bill

80. Goldstein, supra note 63 at 63.
81. Ibid at58.
82. Ibid at61.
83. Ibid at62.
84. In provinces where no private sector act was enacted (e.g., Ontario).
85. This being said, while the Quebec Private Sector Act was found as being substantially similar
to PIPEDA by the federal government, the Quebec Private Sector Act is still more stringent than
PIPEDA. For instance, under sections 91 and 93, the Act provides for director and officer's liability
and for potential fines and penalties. PIPEDA follows an ombudsman model under which the privacy
commissioner has no enforcement powers, although this may change in the future. See Eloise Gratton,
"Reforming PIPEDA with Stronger Enforcement Powers, Mandatory Breach Notification and
Accountability Obligations" (2013) 10:7 Canadian Privacy Law Review.
86. Qudbec, Assemblde nationale, Commission de la Culture,34th Leg, 2nd sess (23 February 1993)
at CC-337, (14 June 1993) at 7635.
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122,87 which, inter alia, sought to amend certain provisions of the Quebec
Private Sector Act, MNA Fatima Houda-Pepin reiterated the primary
purposes underlying the adoption of this Quebec Private Sector Act:
[A]nd, Mr. President, fundamentally, these two laws are intended, on
the one hand, to promote the respect of the right to privacy, which is a

fundamentalright,and secondly, to promote access to documents, access
to information. These are the objectives.88
Thus it can be argued that the Quebec PrivateSector Act, which constitutes
public order legislation,89 applies regardless of the fact that the information
concerns the beneficiaries of a trust governed by the laws of another state
or province, where there exists Quebec proximity factors supporting the
application of the Act.9"
This is further supported by article 3076 of the CCQ, which provides
that conflict of laws rules "apply subject to those rules of law in force
in Qudbec which are applicable by reason of their particular object."
The Minister of Justice's official comments state that article 3076 aims
to safeguard the application of imperative Quebec provisions, which in
consideration of their particular object, must be enforced, even if a conflict
of laws rule would point to the application of foreign legislation, in order
to protect political coherence and domestic legal order.9'
Unlike article 3081 of the CCQ, this provision does not require
manifest inconsistency with Quebec law. It must nonetheless be interpreted
restrictively and cannot be read to have the effect of making all Quebec
public order laws prevail over foreign laws. 92 The Court of Appeal has
' for the local law
opined that there must be a "vital interest objective"93
to
prevail over the foreign legislation.

87. This bill relates to An Act to amend the Act respectingAccess to documents held by public bodies
and the Protection of personal information,the Act respecting the protectionof personal infornation
in the private sector the ProfessionalCode and other legislativeprovisions.
88. Qu6bec, Assemblde nationale, Journal des d~bats de la Commission de laculture, 36th Leg,
2nd sess, n 23 (6 December 2001) [translation by the authors] [emphasis added].
89. Socidti d'assurancescollectives Sodaco inc c Primmum, compagnie d'assurances,2008 QCCS
803 at para 88.
90. See, e.g., Guay, supranote 20. The Court of Quebec mentioned that the Quebec Private Sector
Act applies to information held by any person carrying on an enterprise in Quebec, regardless of the
nature of its support and the form in which the information is accessible.
91. Gouvemement du Qu6bec, Ministre de laJustice, Commentaire du ministre de la Justice: Le
Code civil du Quebec (Qu6bec: Gouvemement du Qu6bec 1993) at 1951.
92. Bourgoin c Rgie des march~s agricoleset alimentaires du Quebec, 2008 QCCS 5348, at para
113; Ferme Avicole Heva inc c Borial assurancesagricolesinc, 2003 CanLII 47539 (QC CS) at para
33.
93. B(G) v C(C), 2001 CanLII 20627 (QC CA) at para 33.
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It can be argued that legislation, such as the Quebec Private Sector
Act, which aims to complete the protection of personal information (and
further protect the right to privacy provided by the Quebec Charter, a
quasi-constitutional act),94 should be considered to have been enacted
pursuant to a "vital interest objective," therefore discarding any provincial
or foreign law governing a trust as the applicable law to a request for the
communication of personal information. In a decision rendered in 2010,
the Quebec Court of Appeal held that the Quebec Private Sector Act has
special status:
The Act respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private
Sector is not an ordinary law. It enshrines the important protection that
the legislator intended to grant to a fundamental right that is the right
to privacy, also recognized in sections 3 and 35 to 41 CCQ as well as
section 5 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.95
The Quebec Private Sector Act may even be regarded as quasiconstitutional. In the decision of Pearson v. Peninsula Consumer
Services Cooperative,96 the Supreme Court of British Columbia refused
to recognize BCPIPA, which is similar to the Quebec Private Sector Act,
as having a quasi-constitutional purpose. However, in United Food, this
conclusion was contradicted by the Supreme Court of Canada, at least in
respect of ABPIPA. The Supreme Court observed that "[i]nsofar as [AB]
PIPA seeks to safeguard informational privacy, it is 'quasi-constitutional'
'
in nature"97
and that "legislation which aims to protect control over
personal information should be characterized as 'quasi-constitutional'
because of the fundamental role privacy plays in the preservation of a free
and democratic society[.]" 98
Furthermore, the Quebec Private Sector Act provides- that it has
precedence over any subsequent statute:
The provisions of this Act have precedence over those of any subsequent
general or special Act which would be contrary thereto, unless the latter.
Act expressly provides that it applies despite this Act. 99

94. Quibec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Communaute
urbainede Montrdal, 2004 SCC 30 at para 15, [2004] 1 SCR 789.
95. Syndicat de Autobus Terremont lt~e (CSN) c Autobus Terremont Itde, 2010 QCCA 1050 at para
98 [Syndicat] [translated by author].
96. 2012 BCSC 1725.
97. United Food, supranote 7 at 22.
98. Ibid at 19.
99. Quebec PrivateSector Act, supra note 9, s 94.
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The Quebec Act respecting access to documents held by public bodies
00
and the Protection ofpersonal information1
which the Quebec Court of
Appeal has described as having quasi-constitutional status,"' includes a
provision to the same effect.
Given its quasi-constitutional purpose in protecting privacy and special
status, the Quebec Private Sector Act could be held as having a "vital
interest objective," therefore displacing the application of foreign law for
data protection and privacy issues. Consequently, there is a strong argument
to be made that such a status is sufficient to conclude that the Quebec
Private Sector Act was enacted pursuant to a "vital interest objective" in
accordance with article 3076 of the CCQ, therefore discarding the conflict
of laws rules that would point to the application of foreign legislation.
Another argument against the application of foreign law is that a
choice of law clause contained in a trust should not affect the application
of the Quebec PrivateSector Act, because the Act applies to all, including
third parties. It would be inconsistent with the intent of the Act to allow
enterprises carrying on activities in Quebec to avoid its application by
contract, especially where such enterprises may hold personal information
pertaining to individuals that are not party to the contract. 0 2 A choice of
law clause included in a trust should not be construed as meaning that
these individuals have relinquished their rights under the Quebec Private
Sector Act.'0 3

100. CQLR, c A-2.1 [Quebec Public Sector Act].
101. Quitbec (Conseil de lamagistrature) v Quebec (Commission d'accs ti linformation), 2000
CanLII 11305 (QC CA) atpara 48. Interestingly, section 168 of the Quebec Public Sector Act has been
considered by the Quebec Court of Appeal to grant the Quebec Public Sector Act quasi-constitutional
status. Moreover, the Court of Appeal has taken the position that the Quebec Private Sector Act's
attachment to fundamental rights such as the right to privacy and the right to information provided by
the Quebec Charter grants the Quebec Public Sector Act "fundamental legislative status" (Ibid at para
50).
102. For instance, trustees may carry personal information relating to natural persons that are not trust
beneficiaries and that may require communication of their information. See Quebec Private Sector
Act, supranote 9, s 27.
103. One should also note that both the Quebec Private Sector Act and the Quebec Public Sector
Act were revised by the Quebec National Assembly a few years ago, which led, in June 2006, to
the enactment of Bill 86 (An Act to amend the Act respecting Access to documents held by public
bodies and the Protection of personal information and other legislative provisions, 2nd Sess, 37th
Leg, Quebec, 2006, c 22). Notably, section 17 of the Quebec PrivateSector Act, which restricts the
communication of personal information outside of Quebec, was amended to withdraw the requirement
that personal information be related to "Quebec residents." The Parliamentary debates show that the
Quebec National Assembly wanted to ensure that the province of Quebec did not become a transit
jurisdiction for personal information on residents of other jurisdictions. This re-enforces the argument
that this protection was meant to be broad and to encompass any individual's personal information
held or collected by enterprises carrying on business in Quebec, regardless of proximity factors,
including the individual's nationality or domicile.
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1I. Application of the Quebec Private Sector Act
Under the Quebec Private Sector Act, when a person carries on an
enterprise and holds personal information, its duty is not to disclose this
information to third parties unless the concerned individual consents or
the Act allows for the communication without consent.0 4 As the Court of
Appeal mentioned, "the protection is the rule and the disclosure is the
exception, which the interpreter cannot and must not ignore."' 05
1. Outsourcingof the processingofpersonal information to aforeign
service provider
Many Canadians have concerns that the U.S. PatriotAct may allow U.S.
intelligence to obtain access to their personal information with minimal
procedural hurdles,0 6 and others see the transfer of personal information to
foreign countries as a real threat to their privacy, including risks of identity
theft given the recent revelations regarding the PRISM clandestine data
surveillance program developed by the U.S. government and the National
Security Agency. 107
At the federal level, the OPCC has issued "Guidelines for Transferring
Personal Information Across Borders,"' 18 which summarizes the OPCC's
position on the issue. Recent decisions by the OPCC rendered under
PIPEDA, following the concerns of individuals about their personal
information being transferred to the United States and thus subject to U.S.
laws, indicate that while the outsourcing of the processing of personal
information to a U.S. service provider is not unlawful and there is no need
to obtain the concerned customers' prior consent, these individuals should
at least be notified that their personal information will be transferred to
and/or stored in a foreign country, and further, that their information will
be subject to foreign laws and may be disclosed to foreign authorities

104. This is so because of the fundamental right to privacy, which is embedded in the Quebec Charter
and the CCQ. See Quebec Charter,supra note 13, s 5, and arts 3, 35-41 of the CCQ.
105. Syndicat, supra note 95 at para 98 [translated by author].
106. Gallagher, supra note 3.
107. On 6 June 2013 ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden leaked classified documents to the press
revealing part of the extensive data surveillance program developed by the NSA: Barton Gellman
& Laura Poitras, "U.S., British intelligence mining data from nine U.S. Internet companies in broad.
secret program," The Washington Post (6 June 2013), online: The Washington Post <http://www.
washingtonpost.com>. See also, Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, "NSA Prism program taps in
to user data of Apple, Google and others," The Guardian(7 June 2013), online: The Guardian <http://
www.guardian.co.uk>.
108. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, "Guidelines for Transferring Personal
Information Across Borders" (27 January 2009), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada <http://www.priv.gc.ca>.
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under such laws." 9 The OPCC has taken the position that while PIPEDA
does not prohibit organizations from outsourcing their operations across
international borders, it is important that they assess the risks which
could jeopardize the security and confidentiality of customers' personal
information when it is transferred to foreign-based third party service
providers, and the measures by which personal information is protected
must be formalized by using contractual or other means." 0
It is not clear if these OPCC decisions can be transposed to Quebec. " '
Cross-border transfers of personal information are restricted under the
Quebec Private Sector Act, Quebec being the only Canadian jurisdiction
that has specifically prohibited the outsourcing to a foreign country unless
certain precautions are followed." 2
In Quebec, section 17 of the Quebec Private Sector Act specifically
governs the transfer of personal information outside of Quebec. Sections
17 and 20 of the Quebec Private Sector Act provide:
17. Every person carrying on an enterprise in Qu6bec who communicates
personal information outside Qu6bec or entrusts a person outside Qudbec
with the task of holding, using or communicating such information on
his behalf must first take all reasonable steps to ensure
(1) that the information will not be used for purposes not relevant to the
object of the file or communicated to third persons without the consent
of the persons concerned, except in cases similar to those described in
sections 18 and 23;...
109. See PIPEDA case summary #2008-394, Outsourcing of Canada.corn e-mail services to U.S.based firm raises questions for subscribers (19 Sept 2008); PIPEDA case summary #2006-333,
Canadian-basedcompany shares customerpersonalinformation with US. parent(19 July 2006); and
PIPEDA case summary # 2005-313, Bank's notification to customers triggers PA TRIOTAct concerns
(19 October 2005), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <http://www.priv.gc.ca>.
110. The OPCC has articulated the view that no contractual provision can override the laws of a
country to which the information could be subject once it has been transferred. With respect to the US
PatriotAct, the OPCC went as far as stating that Canadian laws would be equivalent with respect to
granting to public bodies the right to access personal information for statutorily covered investigational
purposes.
111. For instance, while PIPEDA qualifies the outsourcing of services as a "use" of personal
information in respect of which the consent of the individual concerned was obtained, the Quebec
Private Sector Act sees this instead as a communication or disclosure of information. But this
communication does enjoy one exemption from the principle of consent under section 20 of the
Quebec PrivateSector Act.
112. More specifically, the Quebec Public Sector Act and the Quebec PrivateSector Act each prevents
the transfer of personal information outside of Quebec, unless certain conditions are met. See Elo'se
Gratton, "Dealing with Canadian and Quebec Legal Requirements in the Context of Trans-border
Transfers of Personal Information and Cloud Computing Services" in Dgveloppements recents en
droit de I'accks 6tl'information et de laprotection des renseignements personnels, Les 30 ans de la
Commission d'Acces btlI'nformation (Cowansville, Quebec: Editions Yvon Blais, 2012); See also
EloYse Gratton, et al, InternationalTransfersof PersonalData,Treatment of PersonalData Transfers
in the Americas: Canada,InternationalPrivacy Guide, vol 1, (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2009).
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If the person carrying on an enterprise considers that the information
referred to in the first paragraph will not receive the protection afforded
under subparagraphs I and 2, the person must refuse to communicate the
information or refuse to entrust a person or a body outside Quebec with
the task of holding, using or
communicating it on behalf of the person
3
carrying on the enterprise.'"
Section 20 imposes a duty on enterprises to take the appropriate measures
in order to limit access and use of personal information to only those
employees, agents and contractors who need the information for the
execution of their mandates or the performance of their duties.
Where third parties are involved, such as mandataries' 1 4 or agents,
jurisprudence issued by the CAI requires that transfers of information be
governed by a written contract containing specific details." 5
Over seven years ago, the Quebec PrivateSector Act and the Quebec
Public Sector Act were both revised by the Quebec National Assembly. 6
Section 17 of the Quebec PrivateSector Act was modified as follows:
If the person carrying on an enterprise considers that the information
referred to in the first paragraph will not receive the protection afforded
under subparagraphs I and 2, the person must refuse to communicate the
information or refuse to entrust a person or a body outside Qu6bec with
the task of holding, using or communicating it on behalf of the person
7
carrying on the enterprise."
Two interpretations may be made of this modification to section 17-a
less restrictive interpretation under which using the proper contractual
protections (as well as perhaps also informing individuals of the transfer
and obtaining their consent) would be sufficient and a second, more
stringent interpretation, under which an analysis of the foreign legislation
113. Quebec PrivateSectorAct, supra note 9, s 17.
114. A mandatary is a person empowered to represent another party, the mandator, in the performance
of a juridical act (art 2130 CCQ).
115. In Deschesnes c Groupe Jean Coutu, [2000] CAI 216, the CAI indicated that mandataries or
agents may have access to the personal information of an enterprise without the consent of the person
concerned in accordance with the conditions set out in section 20, but only where the agreement
between the enterprise and the mandatary is in writing and where the contract specifies the scope of
the mandate, the purposes for which the mandatary (agent) wants to use the information (re: the object
of the file), the category of individuals who would have access to the information and the obligation to
keep the information confidential. According to the CAI, this written contract requirement is necessary
in order to accomplish its role of supervising the implementation Quebec Private Sector Act. The
absence of a written agreement could result in situations where personal information could circulate
without any real control being exercised by the organization that has the responsibility to protect the
information. This illustrates that very real concerns pertaining to cross-border transfers of personal
information are at the heart of sections 17 and 20 of the Quebec PrivateSector Act.
116. See text accompanying footnote 103.
117. Quebec PrivateSector Act, supra note 9, s 17.

Privacy, Trusts and Cross-Border Transfers of Personal
Information: The Quebec Perspective in the Canadian Context

283

would have to be performed in order to ensure similar levels of protection
by the foreign law.
a. Less restrictive interpretation:contractualmeasures
The less restrictive interpretation of sections 17 and 20 of the Quebec
Private Sector Act would imply that an organization transferring personal
information to a foreign jurisdiction would need to, prior to transferring
personal information to third parties, enter into contracts with such persons
providing for the protection of their personal information in accordance
with relevant data protection legislation. Such a contract would also
address or prohibit any re-transfer of the data and be reflective of the kinds
of security obligations that may apply.
It is noteworthy that in Quebec, section 26 of An Act to Establish a
Legal Frameworkfor Information Technology,"' provides for a specific
obligation for an organization to actually inform a service provider as to
the privacy protection required for a technology-based document:
Anyone who places a technology-based document in the custody of a
service provider is required to inform the service provider beforehand
as to the privacy protection required by the document according to the
confidentiality of the information it contains, and as to the persons who
are authorized to access the document.
During the period the document is in the custody of the service provider,
the service provider is required to see to it that the agreed technological
means are in place to ensure its security and maintain its integrity
and, if applicable, protect its confidentiality and prevent accessing
by unauthorized persons. Similarly, the service provider must ensure
compliance with any other obligation provided for by law as regards the
retention of the document.II9
This translates into an additional obligation for an organization to
actually inform its service providers on what kind of security measures
the service provider should adopt when handling its technology-based
document containing personal information.
In light of these requirements, the contract in place with the foreign
service provider should provide details regarding (extent and modalities
of) the trustee's instructions pertaining to information to be issued to the
foreign service provider, and the relevant penalties (financial or otherwise
including the ability to sue the service provider) in case of non-compliance.
The appropriate clauses are outlined in Appendix A.

118. CQLR, c C-1.1.
119. Ibid, s 26.
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As detailed below, even when using such extensive contractual
measures (even if the consent of the beneficiaries are also Obtained), it
is not entirely certain that a trust will be complying with the restrictions
imposed by the Quebec Private Sector Act.
b. More restrictive interpretation."analysis offoreign law required
According to some commentators, section 17 of the Quebec PrivateSector
Act may also require organizations to make an evaluation of the privacy
framework in the receiving jurisdiction, in order to determine whether or
not it allows the organization to transfer the personal information. 2 0 More
specifically, author Karl Delwaide, in connection with the amendment of
section 17, states:
The effect of this paragraph is not clear... The second interpretation,
more restrictive, is to the effect that the foreign jurisdiction's laws must
be examined in detail in order to verify if the statutory protection is
sufficient in comparison with that provided by the Qu6bec Private Sector
Act before any transfer can be made.
With respect to the USA Patriot Act, although not coming from the CAI,
we should consider the ruling #313 of the Office of the Federal Privacy
Commissioner, where it was stated that even if one were to consider
the issue of 'comparable protection' from the perspective of US -vsCanadian antiterrorism legislation, it was clear that there is a comparable
risk that the personal information of Canadians held by any organization
and its service provider-be it Canadian or American--can be obtained
by government agencies, whether through the provisions of US law or
Canadian law.'2 '
The author goes on to suggest that under this section, the individual's
consent would not be sufficient to justify and legitimize a cross-border
transfer of personal information to a foreign jurisdiction. It is noteworthy
that section 8(3) of the Quebec Private Sector Act generally requires that
persons be notified of the "place" where their personal information will
22
be held.
It is not clear from this provision whether by using the word "place,"
the legislature intended that a physical or civic address should be provided
or, instead, the jurisdiction, since there is no case law providing an
interpretation of this section. This position is definitely challenging for

120. Karl Delwaide, "A Review of Some of the Recent Amendments Brought To the Qu6bec Act
Respecting the protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector" (2 November 2006), online:
Osler <http://www.osler.com> at 2.
121. Ibid, at 3.
122. Quebec Private Sector Act, supranote 9, s 8.
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organizations or trusts that wish to use cloud service providers, in which
23
case the information may be moving from one jurisdiction to another. 1
For additional protection, trustees transferring the information to
a foreign jurisdiction may wish to conduct an analysis of whether the
information, once transferred to the foreign jurisdiction, will be protected
in the same manner as under the Quebec PrivateSector Act. To be taken
into account though is the fact that the information, once in the foreign
jurisdiction, will be subject to those foreign laws. Some of the foreign
laws may be unrelated to data protection. For instance, they may relate to
the PatriotAct 124 or other surveillance programs in the United States, or to
tax assessments.
As discussed above, some take the position that to ensure that the
Quebec Private Sector Act protects the information as initially intended,
one should also analyze the "risk of harm" to an individual which may be
25
triggered upon certain information being disclosed or transferred.
2. Trustees disclosingpersonal information to aforeign government
upon request
To determine whether a trustee can disclose personal information to a
foreign government, we will first discuss the situation under which the
information in question would also qualify as the personal information
of the trustees (in which case we need to determine if these trustees can
disclose their own personal information). Second, we will analyze if
the Quebec Private Sector Act can be construed to authorize any such
disclosures.
a. Can trustees disclose information if it is considered as their own
personalinformation?
Given the very broad definition of "personal information," there is a
possibility that information such as financial information pertaining to a
trust can also be considered as being the personal information of trustees

123. See Gratton, "Dealing with Canadian and Quebec Legal Requirements," supra note 112.
124. 115 US Stat 272 (2001). With respect to the amendments introduced to section 17 of the Quebec
PrivateSector Act, Bill 86 brought a special amendment to the penal provisions (An Act to amend the
Act respecting Access to documents held by public bodies and the Protectionofpersonal information
and other legislative provisions, supra note 103). Section 91 was specifically amended in order to
raise the penalty imposed following illegal cross-border transfers of personal information. This is yet
another indication that cross-border transfers are sensitive and of concern to the legislator. Indeed,
under section 91 of the Quebec PrivateSector Act, the penalties are higher in the case of an illegal
cross-border transfer (e.g., section 17) than for any other non-compliant activity.
125. Gratton, supra note 34.
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(since these trustees are individual persons). In fact, the same information
126
can be "personal" to more than one individual.
As previously discussed, unlike PIPEDA, the Quebec Private Sector
Act does not expressly exclude from the scope of its definition of personal
information, business contact information, which is information relating
to "professional/employment status" (such as an individual's name,
title or business address or telephone number at work). 2 7 Nonetheless,
some CAI decisions appear to exclude from the definition of "personal
information" some information regarding an employee when acting as
a representative of a corporation and the reasoning to support this is as
follows: since a corporation may only act through its employees, the name
of an employee acting as representative of the company is not personal
information."'2 It is noteworthy, however, that although the trustees' names
or their business contact information will not necessarily be considered
"personal information" under the Quebec PrivateSector Act, 129 there may
be an argument to be made that the financial information of the trust is the
"personal information" of the trustees. For instance, in a case rendered under
PIPEDA, it was decided that while information about a company does not
usually constitute personal information, personal information regarding
the owner of a small business may constitute personal information, since
130
it is closely linked to the individual behind the business.
If this line of reasoning is followed, and if certain information relating
to a trust is considered as "personal information" of the trustees, there are
still restrictions pertaining to the trustees' communication of information
relating to the trust (such as financial information) without the beneficiaries'
prior consent, since there is an argument to be made that this information
should also qualify as the "personal information" of these beneficiaries.

126. The same information can be personal to more than one individual, where, for example, it
contains the views of one individual about another individual, or where the same information reveals
something about two identifiable individuals. See, e.g., Wyndowe, supranote 36.
127. See PIPEDA, supranote 4, s 2.
128. Lavoie c Pinkertondu QuebecLte, [1996] CAI 67 [Lavoie). This approach was also adopted by
the CAI in Leblond c Assurances g~niralesdes Caisses Desjardins,[2003] CAI 391 [Leblond] (CQ),
in which the CAI stated that the name of employees who act on behalf of a corporation, their title or
functions, their address and phone number at work, as well as their written notes and signatures should
not be considered "personal information." The CAI concluded by stating, however, that should these
employees be acting in their "personal capacity," their identity and their other personal information
should be protected.
129. See the case law discussed in Lavoie, ibid. See also, Xc Maison de la Famille DVS, CAI 04 12
89, 11 juillet 2005, c D Boissinot.
130. See PIPEDA Case Summary #2003-181, Alleged inappropriate disclosure of personal
information to a thirdparty (10 July 2003), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<http://www.priv.gc.ca>, for a summary of the investigation.
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Canadian data protection laws such as PIPEDA and the Quebec
Private Sector Act still restrict, in certain situations, the communication or
disclosure of someone's own personal information, if this communication
would reveal the personal information of another individual. For example,
according to subsection 9(1) of PIPEDA, an organization shall not give
an individual access to personal information if doing so would likely
reveal personal information about a third party (such as the beneficiaries
of a trust) except if the third party consents or the individual needs the
information because someone's life, health, or security is threatened.
Under section 40 of the Quebec Private Sector Act, an enterprise also
has the duty to refuse to grant access to (or to communicate) personal
information of an individual (such as their own personal information,
for example, the information of a trustee) if, by doing so, the disclosure
would likely reveal personal information about a third person (such as
the beneficiaries of a trust) or if the existence of such information and its
disclosure may "seriously harm that third person[.]"'' While there is no
case law on point, an argument can be advanced that the communication
of financial information pertaining to a trust to a foreign government may
be potentially harmful to the beneficiaries of the trust (as it can potentially
cause financial harm). For instance, this issue has been more frequently
examined from the perspective of a person's right to obtain access to his
or her file, including the name of the persons who filed a complaint against
him or her. Comparing section 40 of the Quebec Private Sector Act with
section 88 of the Quebec Public Sector Act, the CAI refused to grant
access to an individual's file where he would be able to find the name of
a person who filed a complaint against him, because of the likelihood that
the individual might take action against the complainant on the basis of the
32
information obtained. 1
The CAI has generally recognized that under the Quebec PublicSector
Act the name of a complainant is considered personal information about a
133
third person where the disclosure may seriously harm this third person.
131. The third party protected contemplated in this exception is an individual in his or her personal
capacity. See Lavoie, supra note 128 and Poulinc Caisse Populairede Ste-Marguerite-de-Lingwick,
[2002] CAI 316. This exception generally takes "precedence" over an access request, since third
parties are often not parties to the access and rectification dispute. The tribunal takes it upon itself
to protect the third parties in order to avoid that prejudicial personal information be disclosed, even
if the Quebec Private Sector Act does not explicitly impose that duty on the tribunal. See Turgeon c
Compagnied'assurancesBlair,[1995] CAI 11; Gravel c Sdcurito (La), assurancesgenirales,[ 1999]
CAI 83.
132. Harris c Airoportsde Montreal, [1994] CAI 259.
133. Larocque c Repentigny, AlE 2004AC-98; Hibert c Rdgie de "assurancemaladie du Quebec,
[1994] CAI 136; and Corp d'habitationsJeanne-Mancec Laroche, 1997 CarswellQue 4290 (WL Can)
(CQ).
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The "serious harm" test was held to be met in a case where the person
concerned was seeking the name of third parties in order to initiate legal
proceedings.'3 4 In a converse case, where there was insufficient evidence
of actual harm resulting to a third party, the third party exception was set
aside and access was granted.'35
In light of this, even if we take the view that some of the information
pertaining to a trust, such as its financial information, may qualify as the
"personal information" of its trustees, there is an argument to be made
that the latter should refrain from communicating this information to a
third party (such as a foreign government) without the prior consent of the
beneficiaries of the trust to whom the information also relates. Moreover,
in the event that the third party requesting access to the information is a
foreign government that intends to use the information in order to make
a decision that may have a negative impact on the beneficiaries of a trust,
additional caution should be used before communicating this personal
information, since data protection laws (such as the Quebec Private
Sector Act) were enacted to protect individuals against objective types of
harm (e.g., financial) that may be triggered by the communication of their
personal information.' 36
b. Can trustees be compelled by a foreign government to communicate
personal information without contraveningthe Quebec Private Sector
Act?
Under the Quebec Private Sector Act, a person carrying on an enterprise
may, in certain specific cases, communicate personal information it holds
on someone without consent. For instance, one may communicate the
information regarding a person "to prevent an act of violence, including
a suicide,"' 37 to an archival agency carrying on an enterprise, 3 8 or for
research purposes, if the information is communicated in a way that
preserves the confidentiality of the person concerned. I"Another exception
listed under section 18(3) of the Act relates to a communication for law
prevention:
[T]o a body responsible, by law, for the prevention, detection or repression
of crime or statutory offences who requires it in the performance of his
duties, if the information is needed for the prosecution of an offence

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

XY c La Capitale assurancesgdnjralesinc, CAI 03 04 91, 13 novembre 2003, c H Grenier.
Nadeau c Contrevent (Le), [1996] CAI 171.
See generally Gratton, supra note 34 at 208 fl.
Quebec PrivateSector Act, supra note 9, s 18.1(1).
Ibid, s 18.2.
Ibid, s 18.2.
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1
under an Act applicable in Qu6bec[.] 40
Since this exception specifies that such communication is only authorized
if it is made for the prosecution of an offence under an act applicable in
Quebec, it cannot be used as a basis for a legitimate disclosure of personal
information to a foreign government upon request.
There are two exceptions under sections 18(5) and (6) of the Act that
require-further analysis in order to determine if a trustee could potentially be
allowed to communicate personal information relating to the beneficiaries
of a trust to a foreign government:
18. A person carrying on an enterprise may, without the consent of the
person concerned, communicate personal information contained in a file
he holds on that person...
(5) to a public body within the meaning of the Act respecting Access
to documents held by public bodies and the Protection of personal

information (chapter A-2.1) which, through a representative, collects
such information in the exercise of its functions or the implementation
of a program under its management;
(6) to a person or body having the power to compel communication of
the information if he or it requires it in the exercise of his or its duties or
functions[.]14'

Section 18(5) disclosure exception: public body in the exercise of its
function

Under PIPEDA, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has not ruled on
the question of whether a foreign government could be considered a
"government institution" under section 7 of PIPEDA.142 There is, to our
knowledge, no decision in which a Quebec court or the CAI has taken a
position on whether a foreign government could be considered as a "public
body" under the Quebec Private Sector Act. However, unlike PIPEDA,

which has not defined the term "government institution" in its regulations,
the notion of "public body" is clearly defined in sections 3 to 7 of the
Quebec Public Sector Act 143 as including the provincial government, the
Conseil executif, the Conseil du tr6sor, provincial government departments

140. Ibid, s 18(3).
141. bid, ss 18(5), (6).
142. PIPEDA Case Summary #2007-365, Responsibilityof Canadianfinancialinstitutionsin SWIFT's
disclosure ofpersonal information to US authoritiesconsidered, (2 April 2007), 2007 CanLlI 11733

(PCC).
143. Supra note 100. Section 18(5) of the Act provides that "public body" is to be interpreted within
the meaning of the Quebec Public Sector Act.

290

The Dalhousie Law Journal

and agencies, municipal and school bodies, health services and social
services establishments, the Lieutenant Governor, the National Assembly
and agencies whose members are appointed by the Assembly, and every
person designated by the Assembly to an office under its jurisdiction,
together with the personnel under its supervision.
As the Supreme Court pointed out, this list is exhaustive: "courts have
declined to extend that definition to entities that are not expressly referred
in that Section of the Act."' 144 Clearly, a foreign government cannot be
considered as a "public body" within the meaning of both the Quebec
Public Sector Act and the Quebec Private Sector Act.
Section 18(6) disclosure exception: body having the power to compel
communication
Section 18(6) provides that "personal information" may be communicated
to "a person or a body having the power to compel communication of
the information.' 1 45 It would be incongruous to consider that the Quebec
legislature intended to allow enterprises to freely communicate personal
information that they hold on individuals to any foreign government.
Manifestly, this exception was enacted to allow government officials, public
bodies, and judges to compel communication of personal information
where a federal or Quebec law has empowered them to do so. For example,
government audits such as Ministry of Employment and Social Solidarity
14 6
inspectors empowered under the Individualand FamilyAssistance Act,
or the Act Respecting ParentalInsurance147 "may require, examine and
' 48
make a copy of any information or document."'

144. Macdonell c Quebec (Commission daccos b I'information), 2002 SCC 71 at para 27, [2002] 3
SCR 661.
145. Quebec PrivateSector Act, supra note 9.
146. CQLR, cA-13.1.1.
147. CQLR, c A-29.01 1.
148. Individualand FamilyAssistance Act, supra note 146, s 120; Act respectingParentalinsurance,
ibid, s 88. Moreover, section i8(6) of the Quebec Private Sector Act would not allow a foreign
government to hire the services of local counsel to serve a brief of subpoena duces tecum to trustees to
directly and automatically compel the communication of personal information relating to beneficiaries,
as the power granted to lawyers under s 280 of the Code of Civil Procedure is limited: they may
only compel a person to bring the documents to the court, which will then analyze the legality of
the subpoena before allowing the communication (Mccue v Younes, 2002 CanLil 3058.1 (QC CS)).
The court will not allow personal information protected under the Quebec Private Sector Act to be
disclosed to another other party, if such information is not relevant to the proceedings. One may also
file a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum before the subpoenaed individual even appears in
court to present the documents.
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c.

Informationalready in the hands of thefederal government which may
be disclosed
The extent of the protection is different where the personal information
relating to the beneficiaries has been submitted to the federal government
or was otherwise obtained by the latter. In Canada, federal government
institutions are subject to the federal Privacy Act,'49 a statute that was in
part enacted to protect personal information held by the federal government
and prescribe situations in which such information may be disclosed. The
PrivacyAct was designed in concert with the Access to Information Act'
in order to restrict access to information, where such information regarding
5
an identifiable individual is concerned.1 1
However, while the Privacy Act has clearly been considered quasiconstitutional and its definition of personal information is broad enough
to encompass personal information relating to trusts, the protection
offered under the Privacy Act appears considerably weaker than the one
proposed by the Quebec Private Sector Act because of the very broad
exceptions enacted in the federal legislation. While the general rule is the
confidentiality of the personal information under the Privacy Act,'52 this
rule has many limitations and exceptions. For instance, the general rule
will not apply if other Canadian statutes authorize the disclosure, or if
the disclosure is authorized by some of the other exceptions found in the
PrivacyAct.
A federal institution may invoke two exceptions tojustify its disclosure
of a trust's information to a foreign state:
Subject to any other Act of Parliament, personal information under the
control of a government institution may be disclosed...
(b) for any purpose in accordance with any Act of Parliament or any
regulation made thereunder that authorizes its disclosure;...
(f) under an agreement or arrangement between the Government of

149. RSC 1985, c P-21.
150. RSC 1985, cA-1.
151. The PrivacyAct has been considered by courts as having a quasi-constitutional status. In Lavigne
v Canada, ([2002] 2 SCR 773), the Supreme Court recognized that the Privacy Act has a quasiconstitutional purpose and reiterated its twofold objective which is to protect personal information held
by government institutions and to provide individuals with a right of access to personal information
about themselves. "The Privacy Act is also fundamental in the Canadian legal system. It has two
major objectives. Its aims are, first, to protect personal information held by government institutions,
and second, to provide individuals with a right of access to personal information about themselves
(s 2). Obviously, it is the second objective that is in issue in these appeals...In view of the quasiconstitutional mission of that Act, the courts have recognized its special nature." (Ibid at para 27).
152. PrivacyAct, supra note 149, s 8(1).
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Canada or an institution thereof and the government of a province, the
council of the Westbank First Nation, the council of a participating First
Nation-as defined in subsection 2(1) of the First Nations Jurisdiction
over Education in British Columbia Act-, the government of a
foreign state, an international organization of states or an international
organization established by the govermments of states, or any institution
of any such government or organization, for the purpose of administering
or enforcing any law or carrying out a lawful investigation[J'
The exception of subparagraph 8(2)(b) is drafted in broad enough terms
to include any statute that would expressly allow a government entity to
communicate personal information to a foreign authority. In such a case,
trust beneficiaries would have little to no argument, under the PrivacyAct
alone, against a disclosure made to a foreign government.
Unlike the Quebec Private Sector Act, the Privacy Act does not take
precedence over other statutes. Sections 7 and 8 of the Privacy Act do
not override over specific provisions of other statutes that regulate the
use or communication of personal information, such as the Income Tax
Act (s. 241), the Statistics Act, the Department of Human Resources and
Skills Development Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and
TerroristFinancingAct, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship
Act, and the CanadianSecurity Intelligence Service Act. 154
As for subparagraph 8(2)(f), it states that personal information
under the control of a government institution may be disclosed under an
agreement or arrangement between the Government of Canada and the
government of a foreign state for the purpose of administering or enforcing
any law or carrying out a lawful investigation. This provision is also very
broadly drafted and would seem to encompass any agreement, in writing
or not,' that the government of Canada could enter into with any foreign
state, such as a treaty.
In USA v. Wakeling,'56 the accused argued that section 8(2)(f) was
impermissibly vague and overly- broad. The Supreme Court of British
Columbia upheld the constitutionality of this section:

153. Ibid, s 8(2).
154. Government of Canada, Guidance on PreparingInformation Sharing Agreements Involving
Personal Information, online: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca>
[Guidance on Preparing]. In USA v Wakeling, (2012 BCCA 397 [Wakeling]) the British Columbia
Court of Appeal confirmed a trial judge's finding that section 193(2)(e) of the Criminal Code, which
governs the disclosure of certain intercepted private communications, had priority as a specific
provision over the general sharing rules of the Privacy Act.
155. The Government of Canada recommends that a written agreement or arrangement be drafted.
See Guidance on Preparing, ibid.
156. USA v Wakeling, 2011 BCSC 165,268 CCL (3d) 295 [Wakeling BCSC].
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But even if the Privacy Act is applied, the provision is not, in my view,
overbroad. Disclosure permitted under the Privacy Act is intended to
regulate residual privacy interests which are significantly diminished in
this case by the fact that their lawful interception was pursuant to judicial
authorization. Disclosure permitted under the PrivacyAct is not therefore
unreasonable, particularly considering the contextual factors identified
above including the important state interest in unimpeded and timely
sharing of lawfully obtained information between law enforcement
agencies to ensure the effective157investigation of criminal activity with
inter-jurisdictional dimensions.
On appeal, the trial judge's decision was upheld, but the Court of Appeal
refused to rule on the constitutionality of section 8(2)(f), reasoning "that
it [was] not necessary to consider the constitutional attack on the Privacy
Act provisions." 5 8 An application for leave was granted.'59
At first glance, one could think that the legislature only meant to
cover situations where the disclosure of personal information would help
Canadian authorities enforce Canadian or provincial laws in the context
of a local investigation. Yet, the manner in which section 8(2) was drafted
points to the fact that the legislature intended to allow Canadian government
institutions to communicate personal information to foreign states for the
enforcement of foreign laws and the conducting of foreign investigations,
even where the disclosure does not help a Canadian investigation in return.
In contrast with section 8(2)(f), section 8(2)(e) specifies that information
regarding an identifiable individual may be disclosed to an investigative
body listed in the regulations "for the purpose of enforcing any law of
Canada or a province or carrying out a lawful investigation." "Given
the presumption that the legislature does not speak in vain,". 60 it seems
unlikely that the latter intended to encompass solely Canadian statutes and
investigations in section 8(2)(f). Had the legislature wanted to limit the

157. Ibid at para 33.
158. Wakeling, supranote 154 at para 21.
159. UnitedStates ofAmerica v Wakeling, 2013 CarswellBC 1760 (WL Can).
160. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de lajeunesse) v Montreal (City);
Quebec (Commission des droits de lapersonneet des droits de lajeunesse) v Boisbriand(City), [2000]
1 SCR 665 at para 69.
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scope of subparagraph 8(2)(f) to Canadian legislation and investigations,
it would have drafted the section in a manner similar to section 8(2)(e). 6'
Therefore, where personal information relating to a trust is in the hands
of the Federal Government and where an international treaty entered into
by the government with a foreign state legally allows for the exchange of
information with that foreign state, trustees and beneficiaries have little
to no argument under the Privacy Act alone to impeach a disclosure of
personal information. This means that trustees have an obligation to limit
the disclosure of personal information to the federal government to what
is strictly required by law, in order to avoid liability under the Quebec
Private Sector Act towards beneficiaries.
III. Consequences of an unauthorizedcommunication under the Quebec
law
A violation of the Quebec PrivateSector Act may incur both the penal and
civil liability of the offender.
First, every natural or legal person that collects, holds, communicates
to third persons, or uses personal information on other persons other than
in accordance with the provisions of the Quebec Private Sector Act is

161. This interpretation was followed by the Supreme Court.of British Columbia in Wakeling:
What the PrivacyAct guards against is indiscriminate disclosure of private information in a
manner not permitted under s 8(2). Thus, while it would be permissibleunder the Privacy
Act for the police to provide private information which is evidence of a crime in another
jurisdiction to lav enforcement officials in that jurisdiction,it would be impermissible
under the Privacy Act for the police to provide information to the press or the public at
large, see R v Szalontai,[1993] BCJ No. 2934
(Wakeling BCSC, supranote 156 at 30 [emphasis added]).
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liable, for a contravention of section 17 (cross-border transfer) or section
62
13 (transfer to a third party without consent), to a fine.
Secondly, transfers of personal information to third parties made
in breach of section 13 of the Act have been held to constitute tors
under Quebec civil law. A trustee may incur civil liability for moral and
financial damages caused to the beneficiaries as a consequence of the

162. A violatior of section 17 (cross-border transfer) carries a fine ranging from $5,000 to $50,000
and, for a subsequent offence, $10,000 to $100,000. A violation of section 13 (transfer to a third party
without consent) carries a fine ranging from $1,000 to $10,000 and, for subsequent offences, $10,000
to $20,000 (Quebec Private Sector Act, s 91). The administrators, directors or representatives of a
legal person may also be held personally liable for the payment of the fine, if they ordered, authorized
or consented to the illegal communication (Where an offence under the Quebec Private Sector Act
is committed by a legal person, the administrator, director or representative of the legal person who
ordered or authorized the act or omission constituting the offence, or who consented thereto, is a party
to the offence and is liable to the prescribed penalty. See Quebec Private Sector Act, s 91). It should be
noted that the Commission may not impose fines. Only the Court of Quebec, which has competence
in penal matters, may condemn a person under the penal provisions of the Act. See Quebec Private
Sector Act, supra note 9, s 93; Courts of Justice Act, LRQ, c C-25.1, s 82; HR c Quebec (Curateur
public), 2011 QCCAI 204 at para 20-2 1.
As mentioned earlier, the CAI or Commission is the administrative court specialized in the
application of the Quebec Private Sector Act (Eidda v Crdit Jaguar Canada Inc, 2005 CanLII
25913 (QC CS); Grenier v 1tquifax Canada Inc, 2003 CanLII 19492 (QC CS); Monette v Westbury
Canadienne,compagnie d'assurance-vie, 1999 CarswellQue 1250 (WL Can) (CS); Therien v News
Marketing Canada, 2000 CarswellQue 3324 (WL Can) (CS)). Final judgments rendered by the
Commission can be appealed before the Court of Quebec (Quebec PrivateSector Act, s 61), but the
decisions of the latter are without appeal (Quebec PrivateSector Act, s 69), except for judicial review
by the Quebec Superior Court in certain specific situations. For instance, where there has been an
excess of jurisdiction under s 846 of the Code of Civil Procedure,such as disregard for procedural
fairness. The Commission may not itself present a motion for judicial review, as it does not have
judicial interest. See Commission d'accls c61'informationv Conseil depressedu Quibec, 2006 QCCA
1282). More specifically, under the Quebec Private Sector Act, the CAI is vested with the powers
to issue recommendations (following an inquiry) of such remedial measures as are appropriate to
ensure the protection of personal information. The Quebec Private Sector Act does not grant the CAI
specific power to award damages for a violation of a duty imposed on an organization with respect
to the protection of the personal information (PFc CompagnieA, 2009 QCCAI 192). Under the civil
law regime, however, an organization may become liable for damages should it collect, retain, use or
disclose personal information in violation of the Quebec PrivateSector Act. Such remedy should be
sought before the appropriate court ofjustice.
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communication of illegal and unauthorized communication of the trust
beneficiaries' personal information.' 63
. Finally, since the Quebec Private Sector Act enshrines
the protection
of the fundamental right of privacy,'64 an illegal communication of
personal financial information may constitute an unlawful violation of the
beneficiaries' right to privacy. The beneficiaries could therefore invoke
section 49 of the Quebec Charterto claim punitive damages as a result of
1 65
the infringement, in the case of "unlawful and intentional interference.'
Exemplary damages "may not exceed what is sufficient to fulfill their
preventive purpose"' 166 and "are assessed in the light of all the appropriate
circumstances, in particular the gravity of the debtor's fault, his patrimonial
situation, the extent of the reparation for which he is already liable to
the creditor and, where such is the case, the fact that the payment of the
damages is wholly or partly assumed by a third person."' 167 Exemplary
16
damages have been awarded in a few cases. 1

163. Roy c Sociktg sylvicole dArthabaska-Drummond,2004 CanLII 49387 (QC CQ) [Roy]. In the
few reported decisions, sums awarded under this type of compensatory damages have ranged from
$500 to $5,000 (Ibid, ChartrandcCorpdu Club de 'amitigde Plaisance,BE 97BE-878 (CQ); Demers
c Banque Nationale du Canada,BE 97BE-330 (CQ); Basque c GMAC Location Limitie, 2002 lIJCan
36125 (CQ) [Basque]; St-Amant c Meubles Morigeau te, JE 2006-1079 (SC) [St-Amant]; Seguin c
Gdneral Motors Acceptance Corporationdu Canada Itie, 2007 QCCQ 14509; Boulerice c Acrofax
inc, [2001] RIL 621 (CQ) [Boulerice];Stacey c Sauv9 Plymouth Chrysler (1991) Inc, JE 2002-1147
(CQ) [Stacey]). However, the quantum of damages awarded is fact dependant and relies heavily upon
each case. Where a disclosure of personal information may trigger a higher risk of identity theft,
a subjective harm resulting from the feeling of being under surveillance (moral damages, stress,
etc.) (See Gratton, supra note 34 at 228 PI), or cause a foreign government institution, such a fiscal
authority, to investigate and claim very large sums of money in taxes, actual damages incurred as a
result of the communication may be much higher than $5,000.
The fact that the information disclosed is true or useful to a third party (such as a foreign
government) is not relevant, where the disclosure of personal information is made without having
obtained prior consent from the individual. In Basque, the plaintiffsued GMAC for damages following
GMAC's communication of personal information to credit companies (tquifax and Trans-Union)
that resulted in credit card companies refusing the plaintiff's applications for the issuance of a credit
card. The court ruled that GMAC transferred the information to tquifax and Trans-Union without the
plaintiff's valid consent. The court did not consider the veracity of the information communicated and
awarded $500 in damages.
164. Syndicat, supranote 95 at para 98.
165. According to the Supreme Court, "there will be unlawful and intentional interference within the
meaning of the second paragraph of s 49 of the Charterwhen the person who commits the unlawful
interference has a state of mind that implies a desire or intent to cause the consequences of his or her
wrongful conduct, or when that person acts with full knowledge of the immediate and natural or at
least extremely probable consequences that his or her conduct will cause": Quebec (PublicCurator)
v Syndicat nationaldes employds de bh6pital St-Ferdinand, [1996] 3 SCR 211 at para 121.
166. Art 1621(1) CCQ.
167. Ibid.
168. Sums ranging from $1,500 to $5,000 have been granted by courts for illegal transfers of an
individual's personal information. See Roy, supra note 163; St-Amant, supra note 163; Boulerice,
supranote 163; Stacey, supra note 163.
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Conclusion
Nowadays, trusts are used as international business and investment
vehicles in which trustees may manage assets, securities, real estate,
natural resources or public utilities. In this article, we have sought to make
the case that the Quebec Private Sector Act applies to income trusts, asset
management consultants, and trust companies that carry on activities in
Quebec. Given the very broad interpretation of the notion of "personal
information" applied by the courts, cogent arguments can be made that
most information pertaining to a trust would likely be considered as
"personal information" of trust beneficiaries or perhaps even of trustees,
where these beneficiaries or trustees are natural persons. The Quebec
PrivateSector Act may also apply to trusts even in cases where conflict of
laws rules point to the law of another state, for matters which pertain to the
protection of personal information, where the trust has some connection
with Quebec. Thus, trustees should be cautioned about potential liability
if they disclose information pertaining to the trust in situations in which
trustees are outsourcing part of their business operations to foreign
jurisdictions, or where a foreign authority requests ihe communication of
such information.
Quebec is the only Canadian jurisdiction specifically prohibiting the
outsourcing to a foreign country unless certain precautions are followed.
Where an organization communicates personal information to a third party
when outsourcing certain of its operations or when such transfer is authorized
by law, it should, as a security measure, enter into a signed agreement to
confirm the third party's security commitments. This agreement should
also include, at a minimum, the types of provisions detailed in Appendix
A to ensure that the service provider is acting in compliance with the
relevant Quebec laws. Trustees should also, at a minimum, notify their
beneficiaries and employees that their personal information will be
transferred to a service provider in a foreign jurisdiction and that, as
such, their information will be subject to such foreign country's laws and
disclosure requirements. Moreover, trustees, should obtain consent from
these beneficiaries and employees.
For additional protection, trustees transferring information to a
foreign jurisdiction may wish to conduct an analysis on whether the
information, once transferred to the foreign jurisdiction, will be protected
in the same manner as under the Quebec Private Sector Act. One must
however take into account the fact that the information, once in the foreign
jurisdiction, will be subject to foreign laws. Some of these foreign laws
may be unrelated to data protection. For instance, they may relate to the
PatriotAct or another surveillance program in the United States, or to a
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stringent tax regime that may be found in certain European countries for
foreign trusts. The transferor (the trustee) may therefore take the position
that these risks should also be taken into account prior to deciding whether
to transfer the information to a foreign service provider.
In the event that a foreign government requests access to the
information managed by the trust, trustees should keep in mind that this
information is considered as the personal information of the beneficiaries
of the trust and that nothing in the Quebec Private Sector Act can be
construed as authorizing any such disclosure. This being said, where
personal information relating to a trust is in the hands of the federal
government and where an agreement entered into by the government with
a foreign state legally allows for the exchange of information with that
foreign state, trustees and beneficiaries have little to no basis upon which
to impeach a disclosure of personal information.
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Appendix A
The contract should include the type of security measures that the foreign
service provider must comply with, depending on the risks represented by
the processing and the nature of the information to be protected which
may be sensitive (such as financial and health information). It is of
great importance that concrete technical and organizational measures be
specified as per the Quebec law requirements.
The agreement should also include a confidentiality clause, binding
both upon the foreign service provider and any of its employees who may
be able to access personal information relating to the trust. There should
be an obligation on the foreign service provider's part to support the trust
in facilitating the exercise of its beneficiaries' rights to access, correct or
delete their personal information, whatever the case may be.
The contract should prohibit any re-transfer or re-exportation of the
information and expressly establish that the foreign service provider may
not communicate the information to third parties, even for preservation
purposes, unless it is provided for in the contract that there will be
subcontractors. The contract should specify that subcontracting may only
be commissioned on the basis of consent that can generally be given by
the trust in line with a clear duty for the foreign service provider to inform
the trust of any intended changes in this regard with the trust, retaining
at all times the possibility to object to such changes or to terminate the
contract. There should be a clear obligation of the foreign service provider
to name all the subcontractors commissioned. It must also be ensured that
contracts between the foreign service provider and subcontractors reflect
the stipulations of the contract between the trust and the foreign service
provider. In particular, there must be a guarantee that the foreign service
provider and all subcontractors shall act only on instructions from the trust.
The contract should also include specification of the conditions for
returning or destroying the personal information once the service is
concluded. The contract may provide that the foreign service provider
agrees, upon termination of the contract, to return to the trust all the
documents and files containing personal information it has in its possession
or control. The contract should further detail the specific procedure
to be followed in order to destroy the information upon termination of
the agreement. Furthermore, the contract should provide that personal
information is erased securely upon the request of the trustees 169 and
169. See Guide to the Destruction of Documents that Contain Personal Information, online:
Commission d'accds Ainformation <http://www.cai.gouv.gc.ca>.
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should detail the responsibilities of the foreign service provider to notify
the trust in the event of any security breach that affects the information of
the trust should be detailed. 7 '
A trust may still be liable for the security of the personal information,
even when it is in the hands of the foreign service provider, and it may
be held responsible towards its employees or customers in the case of a
security breach originating on the service provider's side. The agreement
should therefore provide for logging and auditing of relevant processing
operations on personal information that are performed by the foreign
service provider or subcontractors. Organizations are increasingly
including in the contract a right of oversight, monitoring, and the right to
perform an audit of the services being provided as well as an inspection
of the premises of the service provider to ensure that the latter is acting in
compliance with relevant laws.
Finally, it should be contractually provided that the foreign service
contractor must inform the trust about relevant changes concerning the
respective services provided, such as the implementation of additional
functions. There should be a notification to the trust about any legally
binding request for disclosure of the personal information by a foreign law
enforcement authority unless otherwise prohibited, such as a prohibition
under criminal law to preserve the confidentiality of a law enforcement
investigation.
In order to provide for more protection at the compliance level, trustees
may wish to notify trust beneficiaries (as per the OPCC recommendations)
that their information will be outsourced to a foreign third party and obtain
their prior consent, but these measures may not be sufficient under the
Quebec Private Sector Act.

170. In 2009, the CAI adopted a security breach guide entitled: "Aide-m~moire Al'Intention des
organismes et des entreprises-Que faire en cas de perte ou de vol de renseignements personnels?"
Since guidelines on the issue of the handling of security breaches exist (which will soon become
mandatory in Quebec), any transfer of personal information should ensure that the foreign service
provider undertakes to follow these guidelines and promptly discloses any such breach to the trust.

